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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
WINNING THE WAR: SANCTION EFFECTIVENESS AND CONSEQUENCES
Chapter 1 shows that there is a negative relationship observed between sanctions
and civil liberties in the target country, which is driven by how exposed the target
country’s trade was to the sanctioning countries. Using a fixed effect panel regres-
sion covering 160 countries from 1972-2005, it is found that import exposure to the
sanctioning countries drives this negative relationship, with every percentage point
of import exposure reducing the inverted FHI freedom score by 0.165 points. This
implies that restricting imports to a country that promotes an oppressive response
by the targeted government.
Chapter 2 examines whether countries change their trade patterns in response to
economic sanction threats in addition to imposed sanctions. Using a bilateral gravity
panel dataset covering 180 countries from 1950-2005 I find that imposed sanctions
cause a very significant 55.43% increase in purchases from third party suppliers or a
smaller 49.78% increase in sales to third party buyers during sanction events. Sanction
threats cause a 42.05% increase in purchases from third party suppliers, and a 42.76%
increase in sales to third party buyers, all significant at the 1% level. I conclude that
both imposed sanctions and sanction threats lead to a significant increase in trade
with third party countries, preempting and subverting sanction regimes.
Chapter 3 studies whether there is evidence of cheating during sanction events by
examining the difference in reporting for exports in the selling country versus imports
in the buying country. A systematic change in reporting behavior is detected, with
the log difference of reported exports minus reported imports increasing 7.46% in
the case of exporter imposed sanctions, and decreasing 9.86% in the case importer
imposed sanctions. This is consistent with the theory that firms in the sanctioning
country face harsher penalties for being caught compared to the targeted countries.
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Chapter 1 Trade Exposure and the Impact of Sanctions on Civil Liberties
1.1 Introduction
Economic sanctions have been a staple of “soft power” from the end of World War II
to today as a way to induce behavioral changes from the targeted government without
engaging in direct warfare.(Hufbauer et al., 2007) A modern example are the ongoing
sanction regimes against Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs. These
two cases also illustrate the importance of how exposed a target country’s trade is to
those who are attempting to sanction it. The United States and the United Nations
Security Council began sanctioning North Korea after its first nuclear test in 2006,
targeting vital industries and eventually expanding to cover 90% of North Korea’s
bilateral trade flows. However the UN and US administrations have stressed the
importance that China, which also accounts for 90% of North Korea’s trade flows,
must comply with these sanctions for them to have any effect.(Griffiths et al., 2009;
Klein, 2018; Staff and Agencies, 2017) In effect, North Korea’s trade is not exposed
to the world, but only to China and so they are the arbiters of success or failure in
terms of economic sanctions.
The nuclear sanctions against Iran also began in 2006, and eventually lead to the
2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the Iran Nuclear Deal, and required the
combined efforts of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States
and the European Union to put pressure on the Iranian economy. The unilateral
withdrawal of the United States from the agreement is causing short term disruptions,
but without the cooperation of Europe and other major Iranian trading partners it is
unclear how effective the new sanction regime under Trump will be.(Gambrell, 2018;
Herszenhorn, 2018) Since Iran’s trade is only exposed to the United States through
the international oil trade, there is a limited impact that the United States can have
on its own.
This chapter investigates the relationship between sanctions and their potential
for trade disruption and civil liberties in the target country. The potential disruption
caused by a sanction will be measured here by trade exposure, which is defined as
imports or exports between the targeted country and the sanctioning country in the
years leading up to the sanction, as a percent of the target country’s GDP. I then
include this measure in a regression analysis that allows me to differentiate whether it
is the imposition of a sanction or the prior trade relationship between the sanctioning
country and target state that matters for freedoms and civil liberty outcomes in the
targeted state. It contributes to the literature by developing a numeric estimate of
the potential damage of a sanction, whereas previous studies have only examined
sanctions as dummy variables with intensities based on the type of sanction being
imposed, not the actual damage it might cause. This will allow me to differentiate
between the signal sent by the type of sanction being imposed versus the signal sent
by the potential disruption caused by the sanction event and evaluate which one is
more significant.
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Section 2 of the chapter gives an overview of other chapters that have studied the
impact of economic sanctions on liberties in the targeted countries. Section 3 of the
chapter describes the data used to analyze the relationship between civil liberties and
economic sanctions and briefly explains how these things are measured.
Section 4 uses a panel-gravity approach to estimate the average impact of sanc-
tion events on the imports/exports between the targeted country and the sanctioning
countries, and I find that sanctions do negatively influence trade flows. Section 5
builds off of this insight, estimating a dynamic panel model of freedom against sanc-
tions and trade exposure. I find that sanctions affect civil liberties only through the
potential economic disruption they cause, with import disruptions being the primary
driver of this result. During a sanction, an increase in trade exposure of 1 percentage
point of the target country’s GDP is associated with a decrease in that country’s
Freedom House Index Freedom score of 0.0625 points, while a 1 percentage point
increase in import exposure as a percent of the target country’s GDP leads to a 0.165
point decrease in the Freedom score for that country. This effect is significant at
the 1% level, and indicates that there is a strong negative impact of civil liberties
when countries cease the flow of goods to a target nation, in comparison to ceasing
purchases from that nation. This result is robust to the disaggregation of sanctions
into multiple categories, which is discussed in section 6 of this chapter.
Section 7 analyzes the impact of sanction threats on civil liberties, but finds that
the inclusion of sanction threats does not significantly alter the analysis. Section 8
concludes the chapter with conclusions and discussion, with the primary result being
that sanctions which disrupt imports to the target nation lead to worse outcomes in
terms of civil liberties for those nations. Section 9 contain an appendix of additional
information and robustness checks.
1.2 Literature: Sanctions and Civil Liberties
There has always been a concern that the collateral damage caused by sanctions might
outweigh their usefulness as political tools.(Drezner, 2003) In addition to the direct
hardship that cutting trade to a country will impose upon its citizens, there is also
a concern that the targeted government might react harshly and crack down on its
own population to maintain control rather than acquiesce to the sanctioning countries
demands. Wood (2008) finds that both US and UN imposed sanctions are associ-
ated with an increase in government violence toward citizens, with harsher sanctions
leading to more extreme repression. Soest and Wahman (2013) examine whether
sanctions intended force authoritarians to adopt greater democratic institutions and
find that sanctions in general seem to make things worse, while sanctions intended to
improve democratic institutions do achieve that goal. Peksen (2009) and Peksen and
Drury (2010) find that more intense sanctions are associated with increased political
violence and reduced freedoms/human rights in the target countries.
There are several theoretical reasons for this relationship. The first explanation
is a simple survival story, where a regime targeted by sanctions use violence to pre-
empt or prevent a revolution or other form of regime change. Hardships caused by
the sanctions are intended to incite the population against the government and its
2
behaviors, and some governments attempt to confront this effect directly with terror
tactics and fear.(Wood, 2008)
A second reason why governments might increase repression or coercive behavior
when confronted with sanctions is that the sanction itself provides opportunities to
consolidate power.(Batmanghelidj, 2018; Reiss, 2017; Rowe, 2001) When the flow
of goods and funds to a country is restricted, it creates winners and losers in that
country’s industries. The government can therefor increase its relative power by
taking over those winning industries, giving them greater control over the flow of
goods and funds than they had before the sanctions began.(Kaempfer and Lowenberg,
1999), By awarding these companies or resources to powerful political allies, and
restricting access to these things to opposition groups, the sanction event can create
a situation where the government is more powerful relative to opposition groups,
even if the overall size of the economy was diminished.(Peksen and Drury, 2010) An
example of this would be the Iranian Revolutionary Guard increasing the share of
the economy directly under their command during the anti-proliferation sanctions
targeting Iran’s nuclear program.
A third reason is that sanctions can be seen as signals of international support to
opposition groups, both by those opposition groups and by the targeted government.
In this case it may not be that the government fears losing control so much as they
are using the sanctions as an excuse to target their political rivals. A “rally around
the flag” effect where citizens largely come to support the government against foreign
aggression is sometimes observed as a result of sanctions, and governments can use
this to cover crack downs against the opposition which are scapegoated as supporters
of the sanction event.(Olson, 1979; Peksen, 2009; Peksen and Drury, 2010; Wood,
2008) An example of this would be the current sanctions imposed against Venezuela,
which its leadership have dubbed an “Imperialist Economic War” and accused the
opposition parties of being collaborators with the United States.
In all of these cases there is strong reason to suspect that the strength of the
repressive response by the target government would be related to the damage being
caused by the sanction, which is not necessarily captured by dummy variables. In
the first case, a sanction which causes more damage will result in a more disgruntled
population and a greater loss of control by the target government. The government
has reason to suppress its population even more, in an attempt to prevent a popular
uprising against it. In the second case, a sanction which is more disruptive to a market
gives even greater opportunity for the government to choose winners and consolidate
control over the remaining resources, leaving it even more powerful than when the
sanction began. In the third case, a sanction which is actually causing harm can lead
to greater nationalist fervor as the population seeks to resist the foreign influence,
giving an even greater opportunity for the regime to target its opponents.
Another potential cause for the observed negative relationship between sanctions
and civil liberties could be reverse causality, where it is not the sanctions that lead
to repression but it is repression that leads to the sanctions.(Kreutz, 2015; Peksen et
al., 2014) In that case we are observing the fact that governments which enact harsh
measures against their population face higher probability of sanctions, and that more
oppressive regimes would be targeted by more intense sanctions. However this result
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is less consistent with the results observed because if the reverse causality story was
true, then sanction threats should also have a similar coefficient to imposed sanctions.
An oppressive regime should be more likely to be targeted by sanction threats, but
there is no clear relationship between sanction threats and freedom in the data. In
addition, if it was a case of reverse causality then trade exposure would be predicted
to be less significant, because an increasingly oppressive regime would be more likely
to be sanctioned by its small trading partners as well as its larger ones. Together
these make it less likely that reverse causality is a concern in this case.1
The previous literature studying the relationship between sanctions and liberties
relied on dummy variables for different types of sanctions to capture the strength or
severity of a sanction event.(Carneiro, 2013; Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010; Marinov,
2005; Peksen, 2009; Peksen and Drury, 2010; Wood, 2008) The presence of a type
of sanction is only part of the story though, and might not accurately describe the
economic damage being inflicted. A sanctioning country issuing an embargo against
a target that they have no trade relations with would be captured as imposing a very
harsh sanction type, but in real terms the sanction may not be causing much damage.
Conversely an import restriction might cut off critical materials or goods which causes
major economic disruption, even though it is coded as a less severe sanction. The
previous literature included bilateral trade as a control variable but did not interact it
with the sanction event. The use of bilateral trade also misses potentially differences
between sanctions that disrupt imports to sanctions that disrupt exports.
I contribute to the literature in two ways. First I construct a measure of of how
much damage an economic sanction could cause, rather than relying only on dummy
variables to capture the strength of a sanction event. To do this I create a trade
exposure term, which is how much the targeted country trades with the sanctioning
countries before the sanction event begins, as a percent of the target country’s GDP.
By interacting this term with the sanction dummy I have a measure of the maximum
disruption that a sanction could cause, as a proxy for how much economic disruption
the sanction will cause.
Second I analyze the impact of imports and exports rather than examining ag-
gregate bilateral trade flows. This will allow me to examine any potential differences
in terms of outcomes for sanctions that disrupt exports versus sanctions that disrupt
imports. Restricting exports might cripple the economy and cause a great deal of
economic disruption, while restricting imports might increase prices for certain goods
but otherwise have little effect. The alternative might also be true, if the target
country relies on certain key imports for its economy or society while its exports can
be sold to third-party countries with relatively little loss. Aggregating imports and
exports together therefor might miss the real disruption being caused by the sanction,
or it might lead to incorrect conclusions about what sort of sanctions should be used.
1In addition to this I also attempt to control for reverse causality using the Arellano-Bond
method, which uses lags of the dependent and independent variables to try and control for endoge-
nous variables. I find further evidence supporting the result that import exposure is driving the
negative relationship between sanctions and civil liberties. This is discussed further in section 2 of
the appendix.
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1.3 Data
The primary data used in this analysis is an unbalanced panel with 4,633 country-year
observations covering 160 countries from 1972-2005. The variable of interest is the
inverted Freedom score from the Freedom House Index, which measures political and
civil liberties in every independent nation and some disputed territories in the world
over the data period.2 The Freedom score is an aggregate measure of civil liberties
formed into a 2-14 point scale. The inverted form of this index is used so that higher
scores indicate a freer society.
I combine this with sanction and threat data from the Threat and Imposition
of Sanctions (TIES) Dataset, which provides data on sanction episodes from 1945
to 2005.3 The TIES dataset was constructed by first running a keyword search of
legal documents on the Lexis-Nexus website and other sources for keywords such as
sanctions, embargoes, reduction in foreign aid and other related terms.4 Potential
sanction cases were then examined by coders which determined whether a sanction
event occurred, what type of sanction or threat was involved, the duration and other
relevant information.(Morgan et al., 2014) This is done in an attempt to discover
as many sanction cases as possible for any country-pair. There are 9 categories of
sanctions for both imposed and threatened sanctions, which are summarized in Table
1.1. In order to avoid as much endogeniety as possible, sanction events that have
a stated goal having to do with trade disputes or trade flows are excluded from the
analysis. Summary statistics for the freedom index, sanctions and sanction threats
are reported in Table 1.2
Trade data comes from the Correlates of War (COW) Trade Dataset.5 The pri-
mary reason that this dataset is preferred is because it distinguishes between data
which is missing from the dataset and data where two countries report zero or in-
significant trade flows. Because the focus of this analysis is trade sanctions, it is
expected that in at least some cases trade between the sanctioner and target country
should go completely to zero, which is why this dataset is preferred.
Country characteristics data are drawn from the CEPII gravity dataset, a square
panel of all country-pairs from 1948 to 2005.6 This data includes GDP, population
2The Freedom House Index is reported by Freedom House, a US based NGO that has compiled
annual reports on democracy and civil liberties in all countries and territories since 1972. The data
can be accessed at https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world
3The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions dataset was created by Cliff Morgan, Navin Bapat,
Valentin Krustev and Yoshiharu Kobayashi and is hosted by the University of North Carolina.
Version 4 of the dataset is used in this analysis and can be found at http://www.unc.edu/ ba-
pat/TIES.htm
4The most important sources are Lexis-Nexus, Facts on File, Keesing’s Record of Contemporary
Events, the New York Times and the London Times.
5The Correlates of War Trade dataset was created by Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, and
is based primarily on the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics data. It is hosted by the University
of South Carolina and Ohio State University. Version 4 of this dataset is used, and can be accessed
along with documentation at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/bilateral-trade
6The CEPII gravity dataset is hosted by the French Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales, and is maintained by Thierry Mayer. It is accessible at
http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd modele/presentation.asp?id=8
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and international organization membership which are used as country controls in my
analysis.
Finally I use the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset to incor-
porate information on both the presence and intensity of international and civil wars
that take place over the sample period. The MEPV dataset covers all states over
the period 1946-2016, with episodes coded on a 0-10 scale based on the intensity of
the conflict and the magnitude of its impact on the society.7 with separate scores for
war between countries and civil wars/disorder within a country. Table 1.3 reports
summary information for each of these datasets and the combined dataset used in
this chapter.
1.4 Effect of Sanctions on Trade
The first step of the analysis is to measure the impact of sanctions on the trade with
the targeted country. To do this I first estimate how disruptive a given sanction type
is on bilateral trade flows between the imposing and target country using a gravity
model of exports (Ei,j,t) from the exporting country (i) to the importing country (j)
in year (t). Data on trade comes from the COW Trade Database and sanction data
comes from the TIES dataset. I capture all trade flows in the form of exports in
current dollars, the log of which forms my dependent variable. Reported zeroes in
the trade data are replaced with 1$ so that they are not dropped from the dataset
when taking the natural log and to differentiate them from missing data.
This analysis uses the same sanction definitions as Caruso (2005) and Hufbauer
and Oegg (2003), but where Hufbaur & Oegg used a cross-sectional analysis compar-
ing two years of data I follow Caruso who used a gravity panel to analyze the impact
of sanctions between the U.S. and its trading partners.8
I differ in that my gravity panel captures bilateral trade flows in terms of exports,
so that I have exports from country A to country B and also exports from country
B to country A. This allows me to retrieve import and export information for any
given country year. I also utilize time-varying country fixed effects as recommended
by Head and Mayer (2013).
lnEi,j,t = αi,j + αi,t + αj,t + β1S
X
i,j,t + β2S
M
i,j,t + i,j,t (1.1)
where Ei,j,t is the logged current value of exports in dollars and αi,j are country-
pair fixed effects which control for distance, borders, shared language/history and
7The MEPV dataset was created by Monty Marshall and is hosted by the the Center for Sys-
temic Peace. The dataset was created by researching all reported instances of major political
violence which lead to 500 or more deaths over the course of the incident. It can be accessed from
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
8Caruso (2005) uses a panel of the United States and its trading partners to examine the impact
of extensive and non-extensive sanctions on trade. Hufbauer and Oegg (2003) uses a multiple time
series analysis of countries during three separate years to calculate the impact of sanctions on trade
flows.
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other variables describing the relationship between the countries. Country charac-
teristics such as GDP, population and whether the country is at war which vary in
each country by year are controlled by αi,t and αj,t, country-year fixed effects for
the exporter/importer. These also control for multilateral resistance as described in
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The error term for a given country-pair year is
given by i,j,t.
Economic sanctions are added to the model by including two vectors of dummy
variables, SXi,j,t and S
M
i,j,t, which capture both the type and the direction of the sanc-
tion. SXi,j,t is a vector dummy variables which take the value of 1 if country i, the
exporter in the country pair is the target country of a sanction from the importing
country j in year t. SMi,j,t is a vector dummy variables which take the value of 1 if
country j, the importer of the country pair is the target country for that type of
sanction from the exporting country i in year t.
Three definitions of SXi,j,t and S
M
i,j,t are used to examine the impact of sanctions on
trade. First is a simple binary measure of whether there are any sanctions imposed
during a given year. Second is a model of sanctions that divides them into intense
(blockades and embargoes) and non-intense sanctions following Peksen and Drury
(2010) as a way to compare results. Third is a model that divides sanctions into
three tiers, intense (blockades and embargoes), moderate (partial embargoes, import
restrictions and export restrictions) and light (travel bans, asset freezes, suspension
of economic agreement and termination of foreign aid) following Caruso (2005); Huf-
bauer and Oegg (2003). By using the same measures of severity as used in prior
literature, I will be able to determine if prior results in the literature could be ex-
plained by how exposed the target country is to the sanctioning countries.
The impact of sanctions in general on logged exports is reported in Table 1.5. The
results are in line with the expectation that it is easier and less costly to cut sales
coming from a target country compared to attempting to stop businesses from selling
to the target country. Direct interpretation of these coefficients is difficult however,
and so they are transformed into percent reductions for analysis.9 A sanction is
expected to reduce exports from the targeted country by 46.53%, which is statistically
significant at the 1% level. By comparison the target country’s imports are only
reduced by 29.6%, significant at the 10% level.
1.5 Effect of Sanctions on Civil Liberties
My results for the effect of sanctions on trade are consistent, if smaller in magnitude to
Caruso (2005) and Hufbauer and Oegg (2003), indicating that my data and analysis
are consistent with what has done before. I then extend the analysis to civil liberties,
because damage from sanctions can come with costs beyond the direct impact of
declining trade on GDP. The sanctions might pick winners and losers in the targeted
country’s markets, providing opportunities for governments and powerful actors to
9The coefficients of sanctions are transformed into a percentage reduction using %Reduction =
100∗e(β−1), where the β’s are coefficients on the dummy variables of interest. By plugging in −0.626
for β we find that a sanction reduces a target country’s exports by approximately 46.53%. I will
convert coefficients from these panel regressions to percent reductions to correctly interpret them.
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increase their power relative to the people. Sanctions are hostile acts that might
provide a catalyst for purges or crackdowns on dissidents who can be seen as allies of
the sanctioning country. However if a sanction has no economic impact on a target
country, then none of these things should occur, or at least there should be a greater
reaction if the real economic damage being caused is large relative to the size of the
target country’s economy.
To study this I will first use a simple fixed effects model with a sanction dummy,
then I will develop a “trade exposure” term which will show how vulnerable the target
country was to the sanctioner’s action. The dependent variable of this analysis will
be the FHI Freedom score, a measure of the political and civil liberties. This will be
regressed against a lag of the Freedom score, population, GDP, WTO membership
and measures of international and civil conflict a well as country and year fixed
effects, following the general model setup of previous literature to try and replicate
their results.(Peksen, 2009; Peksen and Drury, 2010; Soest and Wahman, 2013) The
variable of interest is a sanction dummy which takes the value of 1 if country i is
under any sort of sanction in year t. The estimation equation for this analysis is
given by:
Freei,t = α0Freei,t−1 + αt + αi + ci,t + β1Si,t + i,t (1.2)
Where Freei,t is the inverted Freedom score, αt and αi are time and country
fixed effects and ci,t is a set of country controls: population, GDP, a measure of
international conflict intensity in a given year, a measure of internal civil conflict
intensity in a given year, and a dummy variable for if that country has GATT/WTO
membership. Si,t is a dummy variable for whether any given country i is under any
sort of economic sanction during year t. The literature includes a lag of the Freedom
because although the Freedom House Index does not exhibit a unit root, it does show
evidence of being strongly autoregressive process due to institutional inertia.(Peksen
and Drury, 2010) Government institutions tend not to change quickly, and the recent
past is important for the state of institutions in the present. .
If β1 is negative, that would mean that sanctions in general are associated with
a reduction in civil liberties and political rights, giving support to the theory that
governments increase repression as a response to sanctions. A positive β1 would be
associated with the opposite, indicating that sanctions promote civil and political
liberties in the targeted country.
The impact of this first regression is found in Table 1.6, Column 1, where the
coefficient associated with the sanction dummy variable is found to be -0.174 and
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. This coefficient is equal to 9.2%
of the average within-country standard deviation of the freedom score.
This result is comparable in sign and magnitude to the results found by Peksen
and Drury (2010) analyzing the impact of sanctions on democracy, as well as the
results found by Wood (2008) which examined the relationship between sanctions
and government violence. This indicates that the presence of sanctions in general has
a small, but statistically significant impact on freedoms as measured by the FHI that
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is within the same range as found by Peksen and Drury (2010), the closest analysis
to the one that I perform here. As this is aggregating all sanctions from blockades to
travel bans, the relatively small coefficient is unsurprising.
Calculating Trade Exposure
Previous literature has examined the impact of sanctions on civil and physical liberties
in the targeted country.(Carneiro, 2013; Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010; Marinov,
2005; Peksen, 2009; Peksen and Drury, 2010; Wood, 2008) However this literature
only examines the type of sanction being imposed, controlling for severity with the
inclusion of dummy variables for different types or categories of sanctions. I contribute
to the literature by creating an “exposure term.” Trade exposure is defined here as
the amount of trade as a percent of GDP that exists between a target country and
countries that are imposing sanctions upon it. The more a country trades with its
sanctioners, the more exposed it is to the potential damage and disruption caused by
those sanctions.
To do this I exploit the existing trade relationship between the countries prior to
the sanction to gain a measure of how important trade with the sanctioning countries
are compared to the rest of the target countries economy. The equation for the basic
export exposure term is given by equation 1.4:
R%Expi,t = β
X%
n∑
j=1
ExportAvgi,j,lag × Si,j,t
GDPAvgi,lag
(1.3)
where R%Expi,t is how much of country i’s exports are directed toward countries sanc-
tioning it as a percent of country i’s GDP. ExportAvgi,j,lag is the average exports from i
to its partners j in the five years prior to the sanction, GDPAvgi,lag is the average GDP
in country i in the five years prior to the sanction and Si,j,t is a dummy variable for if
country i is under any sort of sanction from a partner country j during period t. By
design sanctions should impact exports and GDP in the target country simultane-
ously, so the lagged averages are used to avoid contemporaneous interactions between
exports, GDP and the sanction event.
By summing over all of country i’s trading partners in period t, I find the total
exposure of a target country’ exports to countries sanctioning them that year. For
ease of interpretation I will scale this term by βX%, the coefficient associated with
export sanctions from equation 1.1 transformed into a percent reduction. Using this
term will give an estimate of the potential disruption caused by a sanction given how
exposed the target country was to that sanction.
An equivalent process is done for imports to country i as well, giving an equivalent
exposure term for imports:
R%Impi,t = β
M%
n∑
j=1
ImportAvgi,j,lag × Si,j,t
GDPAvgi,lag
(1.4)
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where the variables are the same as in equation 1.3, except that ImportAvgi,j,lag is the
average imports of country i from its countries j for the five years prior to the sanc-
tion and the term is scaled by βM%, the sanction coefficient associated with import
sanctions from equation 1.1 transformed into a percent reduction.
Potential bilateral disruption is found by summing the import and export exposure
terms together:
R%Tradei,t = R
%Exp
i,t +R
%Imp
i,t (1.5)
where R%Expi,t and R
%Imp
i,t are defined by equations 1.3 and 1.4, respectively. Summary
statistics of these variables, conditional on the presence of a sanction, are given in
Table 1.4. The mean trade exposure for a country under any sort of sanction is 4.3%
of GDP for the targeted country, while the mean export exposure is 2.6% of GDP and
the mean import exposure is 1.7% of GDP. In general, countries which are sanctioned
tend to be more exposed in terms of exports than imports, both on average and in
terms of the maximum results.
Trade Exposure and Civil Liberties
Now that I have measures of how exposed a country is to sanctions I will include them
in my regression from equation 1.2, to determine whether it is the act of imposing
a sanction or the potential damage it can cause which has a larger impact on civil
liberties. This will allow me to differentiate whether it is the simple signal of sanction
imposition that causes target governments to crack down on liberties or whether it
is more related to the potential trade disruption caused by that sanction. I will first
analyze total bilateral trade exposure using the following equation:
Freei,t = α0Freei,t−1 + αt + αi + ci,t + β1Si,t + β2R%Tradei,t + i,t (1.6)
where the variables are the same as equation 1.2, howeverR%Tradei,t is the total exposure
of bilateral trade caused by the sanction as a percentage of GDP.
The results of this regression can be found in Table 1.6, Column 2. Once trade
exposure is included the sanction dummy becomes statistically insignificant, indicat-
ing that the negative relationship found in the previous regression was due primarily
to the potential disruption that the sanction caused.
The coefficient associated with trade exposure is -0.0625 and significant at the 1%
level. Interpreting this coefficient, a 1 percentage point increase in trade exposure
during a sanction event results in a decline in the target state’s freedom score ap-
proximately equivalent to a 1 point increase in the civil war measure.10 Looking at
Table 1.4, the mean trade exposure as a percentage of GDP caused is approximately
4.3%. Multiplying the trade exposure coefficient by this value gives an estimated
10This is equivalent to a country going from no political violence to “sporadic political violence,”
the primary example of which is the United States’ political instability during the 1960’s.
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mean reduction in the freedom score of 0.2696 points, equivalent to 14.4% of the av-
erage within-country standard deviation. Repeating the calculation for the maximum
trade exposure of 23.6% results in a maximum predicted reduction in the freedom
score equal to 1.47 points, a significant reduction equivalent to 3/4 of the average
within-country freedom score standard deviation. This result is robust when repli-
cated using an Arellano-Bond methodology, which indicates that the result is not
being driven by endogeneity. This is discussed further in section 2 of the appendix.
This suggests that the signal of imposing some sort of sanction seems to have little
bearing on institutional changes and freedoms in the targeted country, but instead
is related actual damage the sanction event causes that leads to reductions in rights
and freedoms. Sanctions against countries with greater amounts of trade exposure
are associated with serious, negative impacts on democracy, rights and freedoms in
the targeted country.
Import vs Export Exposure and Civil Liberties
The next question is whether total trade exposure is important, or whether potential
disruptions of imports are more important than potential disruptions in exports, or
vice-versa. Cutting imports of food, medicine or vital equipment to the targeted
country could backfire, turning the public against the outside forces and allowing the
government/other actors even greater power in the targeted country, while restricting
exports such as oil might make it very difficult for the targeted country to subjugate
their citizens because of a lack of resources.
To examine this question trade exposure is split into export exposure and import
exposure, resulting in the following equation:
Freei,t = α0Freei,t−1 + αt + αi + ci,t + β1Si,t (1.7)
+β2R
%Exp
i,t + β3R
%Imp
i,t + i,t
where R%Expi,t and R
%Imp
i,t are how much exports/imports are reduced on average by
the presence of some sort of sanction, respectively. Results of this regression are
reported in Table 1.6, Column 3. The coefficient on the sanction dummy remains
statistically insignificant, but the important result is the differential impact of export
exposure versus import exposure.
It seems that export exposure is much less significant compared to import ex-
posure, despite countries under sanctions typically being more exposed in terms of
exports to the sanctioning countries. The mean and maximum value for export expo-
sure from Table 1.4 are larger compared to potential import exposure, 2.6% vs 1.7%
for the means conditional on being sanctioned and 21.1% vs 9.8% for the maximum
values. Despite this, export exposure does not have any economically or statistically
significant impact on freedoms and institutions. Instead it is exposure to import dis-
ruption that is the primary driver of the negative relationship between sanctions and
rights and institutions in the targeted government.
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The point estimate for the import exposure coefficient is -0.165, which is significant
at the 1% level, approximately equivalent to a three point increase in the civil war
measure.11 This indicates that for every 1% of import exposure a country has to a
sanctioning nation, freedom is expected to fall by an average of 0.165 points. Taking
the mean import exposure of 1.4 found in Table 1.4, the mean predicted reduction
in the freedom score for an average country 0.281 points. This reduction is nearly
equivalent to the predicted freedom reduction of 0.2696 points from trade exposure
in general from Section 5.2, giving additional evidence that import exposure is the
primary driver of the previous results examining trade exposure. This is also in
line with the predicted signs and magnitude for the effect of sanctions on rights
and liberties found by Peksen (2009), Peksen and Drury (2010) andWood (2008).
Taking the most extreme value of import exposure, 9.8% and conducting the same
multiplication gives a predicted reduction in the freedom score of 1.62, approximately
85% of the average within-country standard deviation of the Freedom Index and very
similar to the 1.47 point decrease predicted for the maximum trade exposure, giving
further evidence that it is imports that are driving the results even when analyzing
trade exposure in general.
There are a number of reasons this might be occurring. It might be an indication
that imports tend to be more essential to the target country’s economy, such as food
or medicine as discussed by Garfield et al. (2010) and Akunjee and Ali (2002). Al-
ternatively it could be that countries under sanction have an easier time finding new
buyers for their products compared to new suppliers for imports. Perhaps disrupting
imports causes a greater amount of discontent among the population compared to
stockpiling unsold exports, or that restricting imports makes it easier for the gov-
ernment to choose a scapegoat to blame. Whatever the reason, import exposure is
associated with a strongly negative response from the target government in terms
of civil liberties. This seems to argue against the idea that this is being driven by
endogeneity between sanctions and civil liberties however, because although it could
be that trade exposure and sanctions suffer from reverse causality there is not a clear
reason why it would be specifically with imports to the target country.
1.6 Heterogeneous Sanctions
The next step will be to expand the sanction term to examine three different tiers
of sanctions rather than a simple sanction dummy, to better capture the full range
of sanction types and different signals that might be sent. For example it could be
that intense sanctions such as blockades and embargoes cause an extremely harsh
reaction from the target government, no matter what how exposed the target is to
the sanctioner’s trade. If that is the case then the analysis in the previous section
11A 1% increase in import exposure being equivalent to a 3 point increase in the civil war measure
implies that a country under sanctions where 1% of its imports, as a percent of GDP, were exposed to
the sanctioning countries is equivalent to those countries going from no political violence to “Serious
Political Violence,” which is characterized by localized but intense operations against militants,
opposition members and leadership, the primary example of which is the crackdown on dissidents
in Pinochet’s Chile after the military coup of 1973.
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might be underestimating the importance of the presence of sanctions by diluting the
impact of strong sanctions with the impact of weaker, more targeted sanctions.
To analyze this question I use the same setup from Section 5, but rather than a
single reduction term for each country i in time t, there will be vectors of reduction
terms from the different sanction types imposed during time t.
Heterogeneous Sanctions and Trade
The TIES database divides sanctions into nine categories, which vary in intensity from
complete economic embargoes to targeted travel bans and asset freezes that attempt
to limit wider economic damage. It may be possible that the sanction dummy used
in Section 4 did not capture the true disruptive potential of sanctions, because it
averaged the impact of economic blockades with reductions in foreign aid.
The first disaggregation of the sanction dummy used here is to divide sanctions
into Intense (blockades and embargoes) and Non-Intense (all other sanction types)
as used by Caruso (2005), which also gives me a basis of comparison for my results.
The regression equation for this is the same as the baseline trade regression replacing
the sanction dummy with a vector of intense / non-intense sanction dummies:
lnEi,j,t = αi,j + αi,t + αj,t + β1S
X(N,I)
i,j,t + β2S
M(N,I)
i,j,t + i,j,t (1.8)
where all the variables are the same as equation 1.1, except that S
X(N,I)
i,j,t is a vector
of two dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the exporting country i is under
an intense or non-intense sanction and S
M(N,I)
i,j,t is a vector of two dummy variables
that take the value of 1 if the importing country j is under an intense or non-intense
sanction.
Table 1.7, Column 1 gives the results for dividing sanction into intense and non-
intense categories. The coefficient for intense import sanctions is -0.836, which trans-
lates to a reduction in imports to a target country j of 56.66%, while the coefficient
for intense export sanctions is -0.952, translating to a reduction in exports from a
target country i of 61.4% on average, but neither of these are statistically significant.
Non-intense sanctions also lack statistical significance, with coefficients that translate
to a reduction in exports from a target country i of 11.49% and a reduction in imports
to a target country j of 39.88%, on average. The coefficients for intense sanctions
on bilateral trade found by Caruso (2005) is -0.87, between the coefficient for import
and export sanctions that I find. The coefficient for non-intense sanctions, -0.15, is
also comparable to my coefficient estimates for non-intense sanctions. However in
my data there is not enough information to differentiate between the effect of intense
and non-intense sanctions, because of the inclusion of country-pair clustered standard
errors.
The next step in this analysis is to further break down sanctions into three cat-
egories, Intense (blockades and embargoes), Moderate (export restrictions, import
restrictions and partial embargoes) and Light (asset freezes, reduction of foreign aid,
suspension of economic agreements, travel bans). These three categories were used in
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Hufbauer and Oegg (2003) and are commonly used in sanctions literature.(Caruso,
2005; Peksen and Drury, 2010; Wood, 2008) The regression equation used here is
mostly unchanged:
lnEi,j,t = αi,j + αi,t + αj,t + β1S
X(L,M,I)
i,j,t + β2S
M(L,M,I)
i,j,t + i,j,t (1.9)
where all the variables are the same as equation 1.1, except that S
X(L,M,I)
i,j,t is a vector
of three dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the exporting country i is under a
light, moderate or intense sanction and S
M(L,M,I
i,j,t is a vector of three dummy variables
that take the value of 1 if the importing country j is under a light, moderate or
intense sanction.
Table 1.7, Column 2 shows the results for this regression. The pattern of intense
sanctions generally having larger coefficients is maintained, but again prior analysis
shows a much stronger and statistically significant relationship. Of the three sanction
tiers only moderate export sanctions are statistically significant, with an estimated
percent reduction of 46.05%, significant at the 5% level. This is not seen as evidence
that only moderate sanctions matter, but rather that the data cannot precisely esti-
mate the other sanction impacts in the presence of country-pair clustered standard
errors.
In comparison, Hufbauer and Oegg (2003) find that intense sanctions almost com-
pletely stop bilateral trade with very high significance. However their results match
mine in that light sanctions do not seem to statistically impact trade. This compari-
son is not as straightforward, because their chapter utilized a cross-sectional analysis
to examine the impact of sanctions, but in general my findings are in line with theirs
as far as the coefficient pattern is concerned.
Heterogeneous Sanctions and Civil Liberties
Although there is generally low statistical significance for the different levels of sanc-
tions in my estimations, the coefficient pattern observed in Table 1.7 and findings
from prior literature do seem to suggest that stronger types of sanctions are more ef-
fective at reducing trade.(Caruso, 2005; Hufbauer and Oegg, 2003; Neuenkircha and
Neumeief, 2015; Yang et al., 2004, 2009) In that case how exposed a target coun-
try’s trade is to the sanctioning countries will matter more if those countries impose
harsher types of sanctions such as an embargo versus lighter sanctions like an asset
freeze. On the other hand, the target government may instead react more to the
implicit signal of a harsher sanction type, regardless of the potential trade disruption
that results from it. To analyze this question first freedom is regressed against the
three tiers of sanction dummies defined in the previous section:
Freei,t = α0Freei,t−1 + αt + αi + ci,t + β1S
L,M,I
i,t + i,t (1.10)
where SL,M,Ii,t is a vector of dummy variables that take the value 1 if country i is tar-
geted by a light, moderate or intense sanction, respectively. The remaining variables
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are defined in equation 1.2, giving a baseline relationship between heterogeneous sanc-
tions and the freedom index. The same interpretation remains on β1 where a negative
coefficient indicates a lower FHI Freedom Index score and a less free/well run society
on average.
Results for the tiered sanctions examining the response of the FHI Freedom Index
can be found in Table 1.9, Column 1. By splitting sanctions into three categories, it
becomes clear that the same issue of differentiating different categories of sanctions
continues from Table 6. The only sanction type which is statistically significant is
the moderate sanction, matching the result from Table 1.7, with a coefficient of -
0.136, significant at the 10% level. Again this is not seen to be an indication that
only moderate sanctions are especially important for freedom outcomes, but rather
a limitation in the data to precisely estimate the impact of these different types of
sanctions.
The general pattern of the coefficients follows the hypothesis however, with larger
negative coefficients associated with intense sanctions compared to moderate and
light sanctions. This does not seem to indicate that sanctions don’t matter, instead
it seems that the data cannot differentiate the impact of intense, moderate and light
sanctions from one another in a statistically significant way. This was an examination
of the presence of a type of sanction though, it may be the case that even though
the data can’t differentiate between the presence of the different types of sanctions it
might be able to differentiate between different levels of trade exposure that are then
affected by different types of sanctions.
Heterogeneous Trade Exposure
To analyze the relationship between freedom, heterogeneous sanctions and the trade
exposures associated with those levels of sanctions, the first step is to create a new
measure of trade exposure. Instead of a single trade exposure measure, trade exposure
will be calculated in terms of what type of sanctions the target country is being
targeted by. Heterogeneous export exposure is given by the following equation:
R
%Exp(L,M,I)
i,t = β
X%(L,M,I)
n∑
j=1
ExportAvgi,j,lag × SL,M,Ii,j,t
GDPAvgi,lag
(1.11)
where these variables are defined the same as they were in equation 1.3, except that
βX%(L,M,I) is a vector of percent-reduction transformed beta coefficients for if the
exporting country i is under a light, medium or intense sanction and SL,M,Ii,j,t is a
vector of dummy variables for if the exporting country i is under a light, medium or
intense sanctions. Instead of a single export exposure term then, R
%Exp(L,M,I)
i,t is a
vector of three export exposure terms for how exposed the target country i’s exports
are against light, medium and intense sanctions.
An equivalent process is done for import exposure and total trade exposure. Sum-
mary statistics for these new exposure terms are given in Table 1.8. I use these
disaggregated exposure terms to augment equation 1.10, giving a regression of civil
liberties on heterogeneous sanctions and trade exposures:
15
Freei,t = α0Freei,t−1 + αt + αi + ci,t + β1S
L,M,I
i,t (1.12)
+β2R
%Trade(L,M,I)
i,t + i,t
where R
%Trade(L,M,I)
i,t are the total heterogeneous trade exposure terms, and the other
variables are the same as defined in equation 1.10. The results of this regression
are given in Table 1.9, Column 2. After adding in trade reduction terms for each of
the light, medium and intense sanction cases, the coefficient for moderate sanctions
becomes statistically insignificant while the coefficients for intense and light sanctions
are small enough to be essentially zero.
The light, moderate and intense trade exposure terms are all statistically signifi-
cant with coefficients ranging from -0.0431 to -0.0478, and all of the coefficients are
within a standard error of one another.12 Since there is no reason to believe that 1%
of trade as a percent of GDP being disrupted by a light sanction versus 1% of trade
as a percent of GDP being disrupted by an intense sanction should have different im-
pacts, this serves as a sort of robustness check. The coefficients are also very similar
to the -0.0625 coefficient estimated for trade exposure in the aggregate case shown in
Table 1.8. The mean predicted decrease in the freedom score is between 0.0478 points
for light exposure and 0.129 points for intense sanctions, which is smaller than the
decreases predicted in the aggregate sanction case but are generally comparable. The
estimate for intense sanctions is 6.83% of the average within-country standard devia-
tion of the freedom score, lower than estimated in the aggregate case. The maximum
freedom score reduction comes from intense sanctions as well, with an estimated re-
duction of 1.38 points which is again lower than seen in the aggregate case, but is still
around 3/4 of the average within-country standard deviation of the freedom score.
However there is still value in examining the difference between import exposure
for different types of sanctions and export exposure for those types of sanctions.
Intense sanctions in particular attempt to cut all imports and exports between the
sanctioner and target, so that coefficient in particular will be of interest as a check to
make sure the results from the aggregate sanction case were being driven by differences
in import versus export sanctions. If there is a difference between the impact of import
exposure and export exposure on civil liberties during an intense sanction, then this
cannot be because of a systematic preference for sanctions that restrict imports to the
target over sanctions that restrict exports from the target. To analyze this question
I use the following equation:
Freei,t = α0Freei,t−1 + αt + αi + ci,t + β1S
L,M,I
i,t (1.13)
+β2R
%Exp(L,M,I)
i,t + β3R
%Exp(L,M,I)
i,t + i,t
12Light exposure is statistically significant at the 10% level, moderate exposure at the 1% level
and intense exposure at the 5% level.
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where these variables are the same as equation 1.12, except with the total trade ex-
posure vector being replaced by the export and import exposure vectors R
%Exp(L,M,I)
i,t
and R
%Imp(L,M,I)
i,t . The results of this regression is given in Table 1.9, Column 3. The
coefficient for the sanction dummies all remain small and statistically insignificant,
while the light exposure terms become highly insignificant.13 while there is an ob-
served differential impact on export and import exposure. Export exposure for the
different tiers of sanction are statistically insignificant and extremely close to zero,
indicating that restricting the ability of a country to sell its goods abroad does not
illicit a strong response from the target government in terms of restricting rights,
democracy or eroding other institutions.
Import reductions by contrast have a negative impact on the FHI index, with
intense and moderate import exposure being significant at the 5% level. The intense
import exposure coefficient of -0.105 is smaller than the moderate import exposure
coefficient of -0.206. However these estimates have overlapping standard errors, so
this difference isn’t seen as economically significant. Also of interest is that the
import exposure coefficient in the aggregate sanction case was estimated to be -
0.165, nearly directly in the middle of the moderate and intense coefficients. Instead
the important result is that despite intense sanctions applying equally to imports and
exports, export exposure does not appear to have any impact on civil liberties while
import exposure for those intense sanctions does. This gives even stronger evidence
that there is something about imports that directly relates to the target government’s
reactions, whether it is because import goods are more necessary for target countries
or it is harder for countries to find new sources for importing goods.
The next sections will continue to examine these questions from different perspec-
tives, giving additional robustness to my results and potentially finding avenues for
further research in the future.
1.7 Sanction Threats
The next analysis will examine the relationship between sanction threats and trade,
then the relationship between sanction threats and civil liberties. If sanctions can be
interpreted as a signal which provokes action from a targeted government, then the
threat of a sanction should serve a similar, if generally weaker purpose. Threats of
sanctions can cause businesses to preemptively begin stockpiling or shifting business
plans to account for the potential disruption of a future sanction, and if that is the
case then there could be a relationship between threats and civil liberties as well.
Sanction threats are gathered from the same dataset as imposed sanctions, the
TIES database. In addition to finding government legislation imposing sanctions
between countries, their keyword search is also able to detect when a government is
threatening a sanction. In some cases this takes the form of the preemptive legislation
from the sanctioning country that promises sanctions if the target country does not
change its behavior. Other times the TIES dataset detects threats through news
13The coefficient on light import exposure is very large, but this is driven by the fact that there are
almost no cases of import exposure for light sanctions resulting in an incredibly imprecise estimate.
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stories, where heads of state give speeches that threaten economic hardship against
foreign rivals before any legislation is passed at all. This data is then coded into the
same categories as imposed sanctions based on the type of sanction threatened, to
allow an analysis between threats and my variables of interest.
Sanction Threats and Trade
The first variable of interest will be trade and how sanction threats affect it relative
to imposed sanctions. To examine the impact of sanction threats on trade equation
1.1 is modified with the inclusion of dummy variables to capture sanction threats,
using the same format as the dummy variables for the sanction dummies:
lnEi,j,t = αi,j + αi,t + αj,t + β1S
X
i,j,t + β2S
M
i,j,t (1.14)
+β3T
X
i,j,t + β4T
M
i,j,t + i,j,t
where TXi,j,t is a variable that takes the value 1 if the exporting country i is threatened
with a sanction in period t and TMi,j,t is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
the importing country j is threatened with a sanction in period t. The remaining
variables are defined the same as in equation 1.1.
The results of this regression are shown in Table 1.10. When accounting for sanc-
tion threats, threats to exports are not statistically significant but threats do tend to
lead to an increase in imports to the threatened country, which is statistically signifi-
cant a the at the 1% level. In particular, when a country is threatened with sanctions
it tends to increase imports from the threatening country by 42.47%, suggesting a
strong stock-piling response to threats and confirms that there is a relationship be-
tween sanction threats and trade. The direct effect of export sanctions is mostly
unchanged from Table 1.5, while import sanctions have a smaller coefficient and no
statistical significance.
The primary result from this is that sanction threats, at least in terms of imports,
do have a significant impact on trade. Interestingly, the effect is to increase trade in
terms of imports to the target country, the reverse of what imposed sanctions caused
in the prior analysis. This provides the opportunity to test if it is truly the potential
disruption or if it is reduction in trade flows that is driving the relationship observed
in previous sections.
Sanction Threats Effects on Civil Liberties
The first step will be to examine the impact a sanction threat has on civil liberties.
Even if the actual impact of the threat is to increase imports from the threatening
country, a sanction threat is still a signal sent to the target government to enact
some action or face the imposition of a sanction. The target government might then
react to this signal with repression or other ways to strengthen its position against
the sanctions. To test this equation 1.3 is augmented with the addition of a threat
dummy indicating the presence of sanction threats:
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Freei,t = α0Freei,t−1 + αt + αi + ci,t + β1Si,t + β2Ti,t + i,t (1.15)
where the variables are defined the same as equation 1.2, except that Ti,t is a dummy
variable indicating that country i was under some threat of sanctions during year
t. The results for this equation are given in Table 1.12, Column 1. The primary
result of this regression is that sanction threats on their own don’t appear to have
any relationship to civil liberties at all, with a coefficient near zero and no statistical
significance. So even though there was an impact on trade as a result of sanction
threats, there is no direct effect of threats on civil liberties.
The next step is still to examine the threat exposure, because even though the
simple presence of a threat does not seem to affect civil liberties, there could be a
relationship between how exposed the target is to those threats and the civil liberties
in the target country.
Threat Exposure and Civil Liberties
To analyze the relationship between threat exposure and civil liberties another set of
trade exposure terms are needed. Rather than measuring how exposed a country was
in the period before the sanction was imposed, these exposure terms measure how
exposed the target country was before the threats began.
The threat exposure in terms of exports is given by the following equation:
TR%Expi,t = β
TX%
n∑
j=1
ExportAvgi,j,lag × Ti,j,t
GDPAvgi,lag
(1.16)
where these variables are defined the same as they were in equation 1.3, with the
primary difference being the five year average for exports and GDP is calculated
for the five years prior to the start of the sanction threat. Other major differences
are βTX% is the percent-transformed beta coefficient for if the exporting country i is
under a sanction threat found in Table 1.10 and Ti,j,t is a vector of dummy variables
for if country i is under a sanction threat from its partner country j in year t. The
final difference is rather than being a percent reduction transformation as in previous
sections, the βTX% is a percent increase term, since trade threats are associated with
an increase in trade flows.
An equivalent process is then done for import and total threat exposure. With
these terms I analyze the relationship between how exposed a country is before threats
begin and how the target government reacts in terms of civil liberties. Summary
statistics for countries the threat exposure conditional on being threatened are pro-
vided in Table 1.11. I continue the analysis rerunning the regression of the freedom
score and sanction threats with the addition of trade exposure and trade threat ex-
posure:
Freei,t = α0Freei,t−1 + αt + αi + ci,t + β1Si,t + β2Ti,t (1.17)
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+β3R
%Trade
i,t + β4TR
%Trade
i,t + i,t
where the variables defined are identical to equation 1.6, with the addition of a
threat dummy Ti,t and the measure of threat exposure TR
%Trade
i,t . The results from
this regression can be found in Table 1.12, Column 2. The sanction dummy loses
significance compared to the baseline threat regression, as expected, and the trade
exposure term is essentially statistically unchanged from the aggregate sanction case
shown in Table 1.6. Of interest is that the sanction threat term actually becomes
statistically significant at the 10% level, with a coefficient estimate of positive 0.096.
This indicates that when you account for threat exposure, the presence of a sanction
threat has a tendency to increase the freedom score of the threatened country by
5.1% of the average within-country standard deviation.
This might be because governments which can be influenced by economic coercion
would acquiesce to foreign demands at the threat stage, meaning that threats are
effective at improving civil liberties in the target country or otherwise prevent bad
behavior. Conversely countries that actually suffer the imposition of sanctions were
always going to be resistant to foreign pressure, and so the impact for the imposition
of sanctions is negative. However the threat exposure coefficient is much larger and
negative, which could potentially counter this effect. Importantly the trade impact of
sanction threats was seen in terms of imports to the target country, not exports and
therefor it might be the case that splitting threat exposure into imports and exports
will counter this result.
The next regression is therefor to split threat exposure and trade exposure into
imports and exports:
Freei,t = α0Freei,t−1 + αt + αi + ci,t + β1Si,t + β2Ti,t + β3R
%Exp
i,t (1.18)
+β4R
%Imp
i,t + β5TR
%Exp
i,t + β6TR
%Imp
i,t + i,t
where the variables defined are identical to equation 1.17, with the addition import
and export exposure terms R%Expi,t and R
%Imp
i,t as well as import and export threat
exposure terms and the measure of threat exposure TR%Expi,t and TR
%Imp
i,t . The results
from this regression can be found in Table 1.12, Column 3.
The most interesting result is that export exposure term is now -0.0273 and sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level. However this impact is very small compared
to import exposure coefficient of -0.103, which is significant at the 1% level. This
supports the idea that the primary contributor to the negative relationship between
sanctions and civil liberties is the import exposure term, even though the export
exposure time might matter more than was observed in previous regressions.
The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the sanction threat term
is not robust to the inclusion of import/export exposure and threat exposure terms.
However a closer observation of the standard errors and p-values does show something
interesting. The coefficient on the sanction threat term is positive, with a p-value of
0.124, very close to the 10% significance level. The import threat exposure term is
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negative, with a p-value of 0.131 which is also close to the 10% cut off level. An F-test
of joint significance rejects the null that both coefficients are zero at the 10% level.
This indicates that the signal sent by a sanction threat and the potential disruption
caused by the sanction threat could be having the opposite effect, even though the
disruption of a sanction threat is to increase imports to the threatened country rather
than limiting trade. However I cannot comment further on the magnitude of these
effects, because of the imprecise nature of the coefficient estimates.
1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I analyze the relationship between sanctions and civil liberties, to
investigate whether sanctions might lead to additional oppression as a reaction by
the targeted government. I use a fixed effects panel regression covering 160 countries
from 1972-2005 to study the impact of sanctions on civil liberties as measured by the
Freedom Index. I find that the presence of a sanction reduces the freedom score by
0.174 points, a result statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is comparable
to the results found by Peksen and Drury (2010) and Wood (2008). I then generate
a novel trade exposure variable using the trade relationship that existed before the
sanction event occurred and included it in my regressions. I find that the presence
of the sanction doesn’t affect the freedom score, but rather trade exposure was the
primary driver of the negative relationship between sanctions and civil liberties. A
1% increase in trade exposure leads to an expected decrease in freedom of 0.0625
points, leading to an estimated mean decrease in the freedom score of 0.2696 points,
equivalent to 14.3% of the average within-country standard deviation.
I then split trade exposure into import and export exposure, and find that the
primary reason that the sanction dummies were negative related to the freedom score
was because of import exposure, with a coefficient of -0.165 leading to a mean decrease
in the freedom score of 0.281 points, slightly larger than observed in the trade exposure
case. This result was robust to disaggregating sanctions into multiple tiers as well as
the inclusion of sanction threats, with the only interesting development being that
export exposure is also significant when accounting for import and export threat
exposure, with a coefficient estimate of -0.0273 which is significant at the 5% level.
I contribute to the literature in two primary ways. By developing my trade ex-
posure terms and interacting it with the sanction and threat dummies I develop a
measure for how potentially damaging a sanction is independent of the type of sanc-
tion dummy used. I also examine the impact of both potential import disruption and
potential export disruption, rather than using bilateral trade as a control variable.
Together with these I show that sanction dummy variables are not directly related to
freedom outcomes in the target countries, but rather it is how potentially disruptive
the sanction is that matters, as measured by trade exposure. I also show that in par-
ticular it is import exposure that matters most, with export exposure being mostly
statistically insignificant in my analysis.
This result has potentially important implications for policymakers in terms of
what sort of sanctions should be implemented to avoid inciting a government crack-
down in the target country. I now plan to utilize this term in analyzing the success
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or failure of a sanction regime. It is also important to investigate what is driving
the importance of import exposure relative to export exposure, which has theoretical
explanation but no definitive reason.
The general result of this chapter is that it is not the imposition of the sanction
that matters for civil liberties in the target country, but how exposed that country’s
trade was to the sanctioning countries and in particular how exposed the target
country’s imports were to those sanctioning countries. Import exposure is strongly
and statistically significantly associated with a decrease in civil liberties in the target
country during the sanction event.
1.9 Appendix and Robustness Checks
Measuring Freedom
The Freedom House Index is an annual index produced by Freedom House, a US-
based NGO that studies trends in political rights, civil liberties and democracy as part
of a broader effort to advocate for those rights and liberties. The index attempts to
capture the actual level of civil liberties and political rights in the country experienced
by citizens, not a measure of the theoretical legal guarantees given by governments.
The index is created based on research by a group of around 100 in-house re-
searchers, external analysts and human rights experts. These experts use news ar-
ticles, NGO reports, academic research and their own personal contact networks to
score countries based on events and observations. These scores are then proposed and
reviewed at annual meetings until consensus is reached. This process of independent
research, proposal and review is intended to reduce subjectivity and the impact of
individual bias on the rating process.
Each country is scored based on 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties
indicators. These scores range from 0 to 4 points, with zero being least free and 4
being most free. The political rights indicators are grouped into three basic categories:
the integrity of the electoral process, political pluralism and participation and the
functioning of government. The civil liberties indicators are grouped into four basic
categories: freedom of expression and belief, free association and organizational rights,
rule of law and personal autonomy/individual rights.
These scores are totaled and then transformed into a 1-7 scale for civil liberties
and political rights, with 1 being the most free and 7 being the least free. For political
rights, a score of 1 indicate countries with free and fair elections, competitive political
parties and strong protections for opposition groups and minorities. A score of 7
indicate countries where there is little to no political freedom, due to the presence of
severe government oppression or the presence of civil war.
For civil liberties a score of 1 indicates that the country has a wide range of in-
dividual freedoms including freedom of expression, association and religion. It also
indicates the presence of an independent, impartial judiciary and equal opportunities
in general for the population. A civil liberties score of 7 indicate an extremely repres-
sive society, where economic and political activity is tightly controlled and dissident
behavior is met with violence, imprisonment or both.
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The Freedom index is the combination of these two scores, forming an index that
ranges from 2 to 14, with lower numbers indicating greater freedom. This chapter
uses an inverted form of this index for ease of interpretation. Examples of countries
scoring “most free” are the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. Example
of countries scoring “least free” are Libya, Myanmar and Syria.
Robustness: Dealing with Endogeneity
There is a logical argument that the observed negative relationship between sanctions
and civil liberties is not because governments and populations are responding to the
sanctions but that the sanctions are being imposed because of a deterioration in civil
rights. To deal with this potential endogeneity I rerun the regressions from section
5 using an Arellano-Bond model. The Arellano-Bond estimator is a GMM estimator
used to estimate dynamic panel models in the presence of endogeneity. It instruments
for lagged variables using further lagged differences of the dependent and independent
variables.
First I re-run equation 1.2, using two lags of the freedom index and three lags of
the independent variables to see if the negative relationship between sanctions and
the freedom score is the result of reverse causality. The results of this regression are
reported in Column 1 of Table 1.13.
The presence of a sanction is associated with a 0.195 point reduction in the freedom
score, significant at the 10% level. This is nearly identical to the 0.174 point reduction
originally estimated, the primary difference being a reduced level of significance. The
three year lag of the sanction variable is also significant at that 10% level, indicating
that the freedom score is 0.135 points higher three years prior to a sanction being
imposed. This indicates that there is some deterioration of freedoms in the years
leading up to the sanction event, but even controlling for that the coefficient estimate
of the contemporaneous sanction event estimated previously is robust.
Next I re-estimate equation 1.6 using the Arellano-Bond method to see if the re-
lationship between sanctions and civil liberties is driven primarily by trade exposure.
The results are presented in column 2 of Table 1.13. Just as before, the sanction
variables lose all statistical and economic significance when controlling for trade ex-
posure. The coefficient estimate for trade exposure is -0.0788 and significant at the
5% level, which is very similar to the -0.0625 and significant at the 1% level estimated
in the normal regression. The primary difference is a slight reduction in statistical
significance. I take this as further evidence that my results are robust to the inclusion
of this deeper lag structure.
Finally I re-estimate equation 1.7 using the Arellano-Bond method to see if the
pattern of import exposure being the primary reason for the negative relationship
between sanctions and freedom is maintained. Results are reported in column 3 of
Table 1.13. The coefficient estimate for import exposure is very similar, with the
Arellano-Bond estimator result of -0.206 being very comparable to the coefficient -
0.165 estimated in the normal regression. However the p-value associated with import
exposure in the Arellano-Bond estimator indicates it would be significant at the 14.8%
level, so the statistical significance of the result has declined.
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However a joint test of significance for import exposure and its lags are jointly
significant at the 5% level, while the joint significance for the sanction dummy and
export exposure are not significant at any level. Thus although there is a reduced level
of statistical significance, the coefficient estimate and the joint test of significance
provides evidence that import exposure is still the driving force for the negative
relationship between sanctions and civil liberties, and so my results are mostly robust
to the inclusion of the deeper lag structure.
An additional robustness check is also conducted by controlling for the presence
of sanctions specifically related to human rights. The results of these regressions
are reported in Table 1.14. The coefficient estimates and levels of significance are
essentially unchanged, so I conclude that my results are robust to controlling for the
presence of sanctions specifically targeted toward human rights. The only alteration
is that export exposure during human rights sanctions is negatively associated with
freedom. A 1 percentage point increase in export exposure during a human rights
related sanction leads to a decrease in civil liberties of 0.0661 points. This result is not
true for import exposure, and export exposure in general is not significantly related
to civil liberties or political rights. Import exposure is still the more significant factor
in statistical significance and economic importance terms.
Robustness: Human Rights Oriented Sanctions
A potential source of bias in these results is that I do not distinguish between sanctions
relating to military or political goals and those sanctions which are explicitly targeting
human rights issues. This is similar to a regression performed by Wood (2008), looking
at physical rights integrity and government sponsored violence. It is also similar to
Soest and Wahman (2015). Both of these find that sanctions in general are harmful
for democratization and physical rights, but that democratic sanctions and sanctions
over human rights abuses are helpful in improving both of those. There is some debate
over this though, as Peksen (2009) examines the impact of sanctions on physical rights
and finds that even sanctions attempting to help human rights issues are harmful,
with extensive and multilateral sanctions being even more harmful.
To examine this question I modify equation 1.7 by splitting off human rights
related sanctions from normal sanctions and interacting those with the exposure
terms:
Freei,t = α0Freei,t−1 + αt + αi + ci,t + β1Si,t + β2HRSi,t (1.19)
+β3R
%Exp
i,t + β4R
%Imp
i,t + β5R
%Exp
i,t ∗HRSi,t + β6R%Impi,t ∗HRSi,t + i,t
where all the variables are the same as equation 1.7, but now HRSi,t is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 if country i is under a human rights related sanction
during time t. This is interacted with the exposure terms, giving a combined total of
how human rights related sanctions react differently to trade exposure compared to
regular sanctions.
24
Results are reported in Table 1.14. In column 1 where it is just sanctions and hu-
man rights sanctions, I have results that support Peksen (2009), where it seems that
human rights related sanctions are associated with a larger drop in rights and free-
doms, with a coefficient of -0.235 which is double the magnitude of normal sanctions
and significant at the 1% significance level. In column 2 when exposure is added,
the sanction variables themselves are small and insignificant, but notably the human
rights sanction coefficient is still negative. The exposure terms are very closely re-
lated. For every 1% a country’s trade is exposed to it sanctioners as a percent of its
GDP, it would expect a drop in its freedom score of -0.0453 for regular sanctions and
-0.0462 for human rights sanctions, significant at the 1% and 10% level respectively.
This is also fairly consistent with the coefficient estimate of -0.0625 found in Table
1.6.
Finally when looking at import and export exposure separately something inter-
esting happens. As before import exposure is driving the results for normal sanctions,
with its coefficient of -0.179 being basically unchanged from Table 1.6 and significant
at the 1% level. However, for Human Rights sanctions, import exposure doesn’t mat-
ter. It is export exposure that is driving the results, with a coefficient of -0.0661,
significant at the 5% level. Approximately a third of the magnitude, but negative,
significant and the opposite direction. This is also an indication that perhaps this
is not being driven by reverse causality. There is no pressing reason to think that
human rights sanctions only target exports from the target nation. On the whole
this is a very interesting result that will be explored further, but for now the core
results of the paper are robust to separating and treating human rights related sanc-
tions on their own, and I find that human rights related sanctions are associated with
reductions in freedom in my data and analysis.
Robustness: Polity Score
In order to test if there is just something about the data construction method or the
Freedom House Index score itself, I re-run my analysis using the Polity Score index
which measure authoritarianism, with -10 being the most authoritarian government
and +10 being the most democratic or representative. To do this I take equation 1.7
and rerun it with a new dependent variable:
Polityi,t = α0Polityi,t−1 + αt + αi + ci,t + β1Si,t (1.20)
+β2R
%Exp
i,t + β3R
%Imp
i,t + i,t
where the variables are the same as equation 1.7, except for the new index measuring
how authoritarian the government is. Although not a perfect match for rights and
freedoms, it does deal with political rights and self expression so there is some overlap
in its measurement.
The results are given in Table 1.15. Despite the change in index, I find that the
results are very close, with sign, significance and magnitude being almost unchanged
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from Table 1.6, the baseline freedom regressions. In column 1 sanctions are negatively
associated with the Polity score, meaning sanctions tend to make governments more
authoritarian with a coefficient of -0.171, significant at the 10% level. By comparison
the same score in column 1 of Table 1.6 was -0.174, significant at the 1% level. The
only major deviation is the magnitude of the import exposure coefficient in column
3 of Table 1.15, which is -0.217 and significant at the 1% level. By comparison, the
same coefficient in column 3 of Table 1.6 was -0.165, significant at the 5% level. This
can be explained by the fact that the Polity index has a wider range than the Freedom
House Index, but the signs and magnitudes are almost identical.
Therefor I conclude that my results are robust to the use of different measures of
freedoms, rights and authoritarian tendencies in governance.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Sanction Descriptions
Sanction Type Description Imposed Cases
Blockade Imposer attempts to prevent all
countries from economic interac-
tions with target country.
37
Embargo Imposer cuts all economic activity
between itself and the target.
51
Partial Embargo Imposer cuts economic activity in
certain sectors with the target
country.
118
Import Restriction Imposer restricts imports from the
target country.
447
Export Restriction Imposer restricts exports to the tar-
get country.
58
Withdrawal from EA. Imposer withdraws from previously
negotiated economic arrangements.
55
Asset Freeze Imposer seizes all or part of the tar-
get state’s assets in the imposing
country’s jurisdiction.
34
Reduction in Foreign Aid Imposer reduces or terminates for-
eign aid to the target country.
191
Travel Ban Imposer bans travel to and from the
target country, either in general or
for specific individuals.
55
This table is based on the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions categories.
The number of imposed sanction events are reported in the third column.
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Table 1.2: Freedom and Sanction Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Freedom Index 7.978 4.003 2 14
-Within Std. Dev. - 1.897 - -
Sanction 0.199 0.399 0 1
Light San. 0.051 0.233 0 1
Moderate San. 0.100 0.299 0 1
Intense San. 0.041 0.199 0 1
Threat 0.065 0.247 0 1
These statistics are based on the 4,633 observations
of the combined dataset. The mean of the sanctions
and threat are the percentage of country-year
observations featuring a sanction or threat.
Table 1.3: Summary of Component Datasets
Datasets Description Countries Years
FHI Freedom Index Political Rights and Civil
Liberties
204 1972-2015
TIES Sanctions Threat/Imposition of 9
sanction types
165 1945-2005
COW Trade Database Bilateral Trade Flows (Cur-
rent Dollars)
205 1948-2014
CEPII Gravity Dataset Country/Territory Pair
Characteristics
225 1948-2015
MEPV Major Episodes of Civil
War/International Conflict
165 1946-2017
Combined Dataset Summary of combined over-
lap (N = 4,633)
160 1972-2005
This table reports the number of countries and period covered by the
component datasets used in this analysis as well as a summary of the
final combined dataset utilizing all of them.
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Table 1.4: Conditional Trade Exposure Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trade Exposure 4.3 5.3 1.18 ∗ 10−8 23.6
Exp. Exposure 2.6 3.8 7.09 ∗ 10−9 21.1
Imp. Exposure 1.7 2 4.68 ∗ 10−9 9.8
This table reports summary statistics for trade exposure,
conditional on a sanction being in place. Variables are the
mean level of exposure a target country’s trade, exports or
imports are to countries sanctioning it, the minimum level
of exposure observed and the max level of exposure
observed as a percentage of the target country’s GDP.
Results are reported in percentage points.
Table 1.5: Effect of Sanctions on Log Exports
Ln(Exports) (1)
Import Sanctions -0.351*
(0.212)
Export Sanctions -0.626***
(0.225)
Observations 975,210
R-squared 0.770
Includes controls for Country-Year and Country-Pair
fixed effects. Country-Pair Clustered standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
29
Table 1.6: Freedom Baseline Sanctions
Freedom Index (1) (2) (3)
Sanction -0.174*** -0.00254 0.0313
(0.0583) (0.0576) (0.0650)
Trade Exposure -0.0625***
(0.0168)
Import Exposure -0.165**
(0.0640)
Export Exposure -0.0170
(0.0192)
Lag Freedom 0.852*** 0.848*** 0.848***
(0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0144)
Pop -0.000800 -0.000674 -0.000812
(0.000631) (0.000593) (0.000627)
GDP -0.0709** -0.0727** -0.0723**
(0.0288) (0.0303) (0.0310)
WTO Member -0.103 -0.0800 -0.0849
(0.0671) (0.0659) (0.0656)
International War 0.00243 0.00416 0.0121
(0.0265) (0.0257) (0.0248)
Civil War -0.0685*** -0.0684*** -0.0679***
(0.0155) (0.0164) (0.0161)
Observations 4,633 4,633 4,633
R-squared 0.951 0.952 0.952
Robust standard errors adjusted for country clustering are reported in
parentheses. All regressions also include country and year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7: Heterogeneous Sanctions and Log Exports
Ln(Exports) (1) (2)
Intense Import San. -0.836 -0.838
(0.576) (0.572)
Non-Intense Import San. -0.122
(0.221)
Intense Export San. -0.952 -1.013
(0.656) (0.639)
Non-Intense Export San. -0.355
(0.225)
Moderate Import San. -0.168
(0.282)
Moderate Export San. -0.617**
(0.289)
Light Import San. -0.00191
(0.263)
Light Export San. 0.159
(0.288)
Observations 975,210 975,210
R-squared 0.770 0.770
Includes controls for Country-Year and Country-Pair
fixed effects. Country-Pair Clustered standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
31
Table 1.8: Conditional Heterogeneous Trade Exposure Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Max
Light Exposure 1 3.4 28.4
Moderate Exposure 2.8 3.8 22.1
Intense Exposure 3 7.9 31.9
Light Export Exposure 1 3.4 28.4
Light Import Exposure 0 0 0.6
Moderate Export Exposure 1.1 2.3 20.9
Moderate Import Exposure 0.3 0.6 3.8
Intense Export Exposure 1.7 4.9 18.2
Intense Import Exposure 1.3 3.3 14.2
This table reports summary statistics for trade exposure,
conditional on a sanction being in place. Variables are the
mean level of exposure a target country’s trade, exports or
imports are to countries sanctioning it, the minimum level
of exposure observed and the max level of exposure
observed as a percentage of the target country’s GDP.
Results are reported in percentage points.
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Table 1.9: Heterogeneous Sanctions and Freedom
Freedom Index (1) (2) (3)
Intense -0.213 0.0170 0.0503
(0.131) (0.174) (0.184)
Moderate -0.228*** -0.115 -0.0854
(0.0675) (0.0703) (0.0760)
Light -0.0809 0.0511 0.181
(0.0770) (0.0733) (0.111)
Intense Exposure -0.0431**
(0.0210)
Moderate Exposure -0.0461***
(0.0124)
Light Exposure -0.0478*
(0.0252)
Import Intense Exposure -0.105**
(0.0438)
Export Intense Exposure -0.00229
(0.0255)
Import Moderate Exposure -0.206**
(0.0980)
Export Moderate Exposure -0.0187
(0.0210)
Import Light Exposure -34.82
(21.30)
Export Light Exposure -0.0102
(0.0167)
Lag Freedom 0.851*** 0.847*** 0.847***
(0.0143) (0.0145) (0.0145)
Pop -0.000765 -0.000592 -0.000688
(0.000634) (0.000638) (0.000652)
GDP -0.0692** -0.0731** -0.0723**
(0.0268) (0.0287) (0.0289)
WTO Member -0.109 -0.0855 -0.0925
(0.0673) (0.0660) (0.0661)
International War 0.00338 0.00512 0.0136
(0.0265) (0.0257) (0.0248)
Civil War -0.0690*** -0.0688*** -0.0693***
(0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0159)
Observations 4,633 4,633 4,633
R-squared 0.951 0.952 0.952
Robust standard errors adjusted for country clustering are reported in
parentheses. All regressions also include country and year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.10: Sanction Threats and Log Exports
Ln(Exports) (1)
Import Sanctions -0.138
(0.160)
Export Sanctions -0.721***
(0.181)
Import Threats 0.359***
(0.119)
Export Threats 0.134
(0.145)
EIA 0.00262***
(0.000475)
Observations 852,469
R-squared 0.757
Includes controls for Country-Year and Country-Pair
fixed effects. Country-Pair Clustered standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.11: Conditional Threat Exposure Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trade Threat Exposure 8.5 9.7 3.05 ∗ 10−10 56.1
Exp. Threat Exposure 4.3 5.6 1.53 ∗ 10−10 28.6
Imp. Threat Exposure 4.2 5.1 1.52 ∗ 10−10 32.1
This table reports summary statistics for threat exposure,
conditional on a threat being in place. Variables are the mean
level of exposure a target country’s trade, exports or imports
are to countries threatening it, the minimum level of exposure
observed and the max level of exposure observed as a percentage
of the target country’s GDP.
Results are reported in percentage points.
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Table 1.12: Sanction Threats and Freedom
Freedom Index (1) (2) (3)
Sanction -0.174*** 0.00483 0.0257
(0.0582) (0.0591) (0.0616)
Threat 0.0821 0.0960* 0.0874
(0.0574) (0.0581) (0.0565)
Trade Exposure -0.0498***
(0.0101)
Trade Threat Exposure -1.511
(1.119)
Import Exposure -0.103***
(0.0377)
Export Exposure -0.0273**
(0.0125)
Import Threat Exposure -6.029
(3.970)
Export Threat Exposure 2.335
(2.342)
Lag Freedom 0.852*** 0.849*** 0.849***
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0142)
Pop -0.000869 -0.000722 -0.000842
(0.000632) (0.000597) (0.000628)
GDP -0.0708** -0.0719** -0.0730**
(0.0291) (0.0303) (0.0317)
WTO Member -0.103 -0.0777 -0.0840
(0.0671) (0.0662) (0.0658)
International War 0.00132 0.00283 0.00817
(0.0261) (0.0252) (0.0243)
Civil War -0.0690*** -0.0681*** -0.0686***
(0.0155) (0.0162) (0.0160)
Observations 4,633 4,633 4,633
R-squared 0.951 0.952 0.952
Robust standard errors adjusted for country clustering are reported in
parentheses. All regressions also include country and year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.13: Arellano-Bond Sanction Estimation
Freedom Index (1) (2) (3)
Lag Freedom 0.858*** 0.854*** 0.855***
(0.0370) (0.0367) (0.0370)
Lag2 Freedom -0.0442* -0.0443* -0.0428*
(0.0263) (0.0253) (0.0254)
Sanction -0.195* -0.0347 -0.00604
(0.105) (0.0925) (0.0950)
Lag Sanction 0.111 0.00921 0.00400
(0.0896) (0.0937) (0.0938)
Lag2 Sanction 0.00563 -0.0353 -0.0492
(0.0780) (0.0795) (0.0841)
Lag3 Sanction 0.135* 0.0529 0.0463
(0.0788) (0.0854) (0.0852)
Trade Exposure -0.0788**
(0.0330)
Lag Trade Exposure 0.0241
(0.0320)
Lag2 Trade Exposure 0.00254
(0.0196)
Lag3 Trade Exposure 0.0270
(0.0245)
Import Exposure -0.206
(0.148)
Lag Import Exposure 0.0348
(0.132)
Lag2 Import Exposure 0.0335
(0.0719)
Lag3 Import Exposure 0.0541
(0.0915)
Export Exposure -0.0189
(0.0525)
Lag Export Exposure 0.0140
(0.0511)
Lag2 Export Exposure -0.0107
(0.0335)
Lag3 Export Exposure 0.0167
(0.0362)
Constant 1.561*** 1.838*** 1.579***
(0.216) (0.222) (0.226)
Observations 3,975 3,975 3,975
Number of Countries 159 159 159
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
36
Table 1.14: Human Rights Related Sanctions
Freedom Index (1) (2) (3)
Sanction -0.118* 0.0203 0.0547
(0.0599) (0.0633) (0.0694)
Human Rights San -0.235*** -0.102 -0.0890
(0.0795) (0.0780) (0.0845)
Trade Exposure -0.0453***
(0.0146)
Trade*Rights San. -0.0462*
(0.0242)
Import Exposure -0.179***
(0.0604)
Export Exposure 0.0132
(0.0218)
Import*Rights San. -0.00174
(0.0755)
Export*Rights San. -0.0661**
(0.0318)
Lag Freedom 0.850*** 0.847*** 0.848***
(0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0152)
Pop -0.000417 -0.000386 -0.000528
(0.000474) (0.000507) (0.000555)
GDP -0.0729** -0.0755** -0.0752**
(0.0293) (0.0309) (0.0316)
WTO Member -0.0841 -0.0650 -0.0691
(0.0671) (0.0664) (0.0662)
International War 0.00317 0.00828 0.0136
(0.0270) (0.0267) (0.0258)
Civil War -0.0681*** -0.0701*** -0.0696***
(0.0150) (0.0159) (0.0158)
Observations 4,464 4,464 4,464
R-squared 0.953 0.954 0.954
Includes controls for Country-Year and Country-Pair
fixed effects. Country-Pair Clustered standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.15: Polity Index Robustness Check
Polity Score (1) (2) (3)
Sanction -0.171* 0.0303 0.0803
(0.0890) (0.102) (0.104)
Exposure -0.0693***
(0.0175)
Import Exposure -0.217***
(0.0617)
Export Exposure -0.00510
(0.0311)
Lag Polity 0.867*** 0.865*** 0.866***
(0.00743) (0.00743) (0.00743)
Pop -0.000246 -6.26e-05 -0.000246
(0.00147) (0.00147) (0.00147)
GDP -0.183** -0.188** -0.187**
(0.0795) (0.0793) (0.0793)
WTO Membership 0.109 0.136 0.129
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
International War 0.0467 0.0478 0.0541
(0.0610) (0.0609) (0.0609)
Civil War -0.0384 -0.0376 -0.0360
(0.0262) (0.0261) (0.0261)
Observations 4,416 4,416 4,416
R-squared 0.952 0.952 0.952
Includes controls for Country-Year and Country-Pair
fixed effects. Country-Pair Clustered standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 2 Sanctions, Threats and Trade Diversion
2.1 Introduction
Economic Sanctions have become a major foreign policy tool in recent years, partic-
ularly for the United States. Determining the effectiveness of sanctions at inflicting
economic damage is critical for designing sanctions which will achieve their stated
goals. For example, sanctions placed on Iran were successful in that the regime there
agreed to negotiations and later restrictions on their nuclear program because the
sanctions were effective at stifling economic growth.
A critical component of this was that the restrictions on trade could not be out-
maneuvered by diverting trade to third party countries not involved in the sanction
regime. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, sanctions do have definite negative impacts
on trade between the sanctioner and the target nation. However, even before sanc-
tions begin they can alter behavior in the target nations.(Lee and Lee, 2018) When
sanctions are threatened nations can attempt to divert their trade behavior, to lessen
the shock of an imposed sanction as the Sandinistas did in the 1980’s.(Rodman, 2001)
Other examples of this can be found in the response of Libya and Iran to sanction
threats in the 1990s and early 2000s.(O’Sullivan, 2003) Accounting for this effect is
therefor important for sanction regime design.
This chapter advances the literature by studying the impact of trade diversion
from both imposed sanctions and sanction threats, which will allow an analysis of
how target country behavior changes in response to sanction threats both directly
in terms of trade between itself and the sanctioning country and trade with third
party countries. Secondly I will measure trade diversion in terms of trade toward
the target nation’s top trade partners not involved in the sanctions, which will allow
for a general analysis of trade diversion and the use of country-pair and country-year
fixed effects. The use of fixed effects will help solve the selection problem, because
the decision to impose a sanction is not exogenous to trade relations.
In section 2.2 I examine the previous literature looking at the impact of sanctions
on trade and trade diversion. In section 2.3 I explain the data used in this analysis
and give a brief overview of how the dataset was constructed. In section 2.4 I run
a regression of imposed sanctions and sanction threats to measure the direct impact
on trade between the sanctioner-target pair by replicating the analysis from Allen
(2019). The results of this analysis are given in Table 2.3. I find that importer
imposed sanctions reduce trade into the sanctioning country by 51.37%, significant
at the 1% level.1 However exporter imposed sanctions do not have a significant impact
on trade between the sanctioning and target pair. The opposite is true for threats,
where sanction threats issued by the exporting country results in an increase in sales
1This is found by taking the coefficient of the Importer Imposed Sanction dummy variable and
converting it into a percent change using 100 ∗ (eβ − 1). Other coefficients are also reported in
percent changes using this same conversion method.
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to the target country of 43.19%. Conversely sanction threats issued by the importing
country do not significantly affect trade.
In section 2.5 I expand that analysis with the inclusion of trade diversion and
threat diversion variables to analyze the impact of these events on the wider trade
network of the target country. Strong evidence of trade diversion is found for both
imposed sanctions and during sanction threats. Imports from third party suppliers
during a sanction event increases by an average of 55.43%, significant at the 1% signif-
icance level. Sales to third party buyers also increase, going up by 49.78%, significant
at the 1% level. Imports from third parties during sanction threats increases by
42.05%, significant at the 1% level while sales to third parties during sanction threats
increases 42.76% during sanction events, significant at the 1% level. This indicates
that controlling with country-year and country-pair fixed effects that countries do
divert trade to alternate markets before and during sanction events.
Section 2.6 breaks the sanction and diversion variables in multiple heterogeneous
variables, which are analyzed for any differential effect that different intensities of
sanctions might have. Final conclusions and discussion are found in section 2.7.
2.2 Literature: Sanctions and Trade Diversion
There is a great deal of interest in the idea of sanction busting in the literature.
Kakutani (2017) examines how the proliferation of multinational companies will lead
to increased sanction busting so long as the rents created by the sanction exceed the
potential cost. A theoretical example is Drezner (2000), who develops the bargaining
game that exists between the sanctioner and target, and the sanctioner and third
parties. He finds that empirically sanctions backed by an international organization
such as the UN are more effective than multilateral sanction regimes developed be-
tween nations, because the UN provides an enforcement mechanism and additional
incentive to maintain the sanctions. Kopp (2005) shows how UN sanction design
policies can actually encourage sanction busting if there is not an enforcement proce-
dure. Many papers which are interested in determining the success of sanctions take
interest in sanction busting, as the ability to subvert a sanction makes it much easier
for countries to resist sanctions.
The primary inspiration for this chapter is Caruso (2005), which uses a panel
gravity framework for bilateral trade between the United States and 49 partner coun-
tries over the period 1960-2000. Logged bilateral trade flows are regressed against
the GDP of the two trading partners, the population of the two countries, distance
between the countries and dummy variables indicating whether or not the reporter
country was involved in war/civil war. However it does not include standard country
fixed effects to account for multilateral resistance.
Caruso then augments their gravity model with dummy variables for “extensive”
sanctions, blockades and embargoes as defined by Hufbauer and Oegg (2003), and
“moderate” sanctions which covers everything else. He finds that limited/moderate
sanctions have a positive but not statistically significant impact on bilateral trade
flows, which he attributes to the low intensity of the sanction measures which may
have negligible aggregate impact. However he does find that extensive sanctions,
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especially those undertaken by multiple countries alongside the United States, are
extremely effective in disrupting bilateral trade, reducing it by nearly 90%. This
result is consistent with the earlier work by Hufbauer and Oegg (2003).
He then tests for trade diversion, where trade is redirected to third party countries
to make up for lost trade with the sanctioning country. This is done by building a
new panel of data using the same 49 partner countries, but instead of trade between
the partner countries and the United States this second panel has trade with between
“the other G-7 countries” and countries sanctioned by the United States. He finds
that extensive sanctions are effective at reducing trade generally, but that there is
evidence of sanction busting for moderate sanction events.
Another paper that takes a similar approach is Yang et al. (2009), which uses a
gravity panel approach examining logged bilateral trade between the European Union
and 166 partner countries over the time period from 1980 to 2003. They include a
dummy variable taking the value of 1 for if a country is being sanctioned by the
US, another for if the country is being sanctioned by the EU and finally interaction
terms between them. They find that the presence of US sanctions against a country
tends to reduce trade between the targeted nation and the EU, but that the longer a
sanction goes on the more likely it is countries divert their trade to the EU.
Early (2009) also approaches the question of trade diversion and sanction busting,
but from the perspective that when the US imposes sanctions on a target, it is allies of
the United States that tend to step in to increase trade with the target nation more
than unrelated third party countries. He develops a dummy variable for ‘sanction
buster’ by examining the percent change in trade between third party countries and
the target nation before and after the sanction, then uses that as the dependent
variable in a logit regression. He finds for US imposed sanctions it is allies of the US
who are most likely to ‘bust’ the sanction by increasing trade with the target nation.
I will make two main contributions to this field. The first is that I will use trade
diversion to the top 10 trade partners of the target country that are not involved
with the sanction regime as part of a bilateral gravity panel. This will capture
trade diversion between a targeted nation and its major trade partners, rather than
restricting the detection of trade diversion to specific groups such as G7 or the EU.
Also, by restricting trade diversion to the top 10 trade partners and using smaller
trade partners as a comparison group I will be able to use country-year fixed effects.
In addition to controlling for population, GDP and other standard country charac-
teristics the inclusion of fixed effects will at least partially control for the inherent
selection problem that exists when studying the impact of sanctions on trade. The
decision to impose a sanction is not exogenous to the trade relationship between two
countries, but country-year fixed effects will capture any political shocks within the
target country that would both increase the likelihood of the target to be targeted by
economic sanctions and affect trade flows between the target and its trade partners.
This use of fixed effects here is similar to their use in the trade agreement lit-
erature, where the decision to enter into a trade agreement is not exogenous to the
existing trade relationship between the two countries.(Baier and Bergstrand, 2007;
Baier et al., 2014; Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007; Regolo, 2013; Soete and Hove, 2017)
Using country-pair and country-year fixed effects to capture the observable factors
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that affect both the decision to enter into a trade agreement and the level of trade
in general, I will partially control for the endogeniety of the decision to sanction and
the level of trade between the nations.
The second contribution is that I will account for trade diversion during the threat
stage of a sanction as well as trade diversion caused by imposed sanctions. If a
country is faced by a serious threat of sanctions it might preemptively adjust trade
to lessen the shock if/when the sanction is actually imposed. If this hedging behavior
is prevalent then coefficient estimates of the impact of sanctions on trade flows could
be biased, indicating that sanctions might have greater impact on trade flows than
otherwise indicated.
2.3 Data
The dataset used in this chapter is an imbalanced panel created by combining the
Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset, the Correlates of War Trade
Dataset and the CEPII gravity dataset. The combined dataset contains information
on 180 countries over the period 1950-2005, with a total of 15,335 country pairs. The
total combined sample size of 852,469 country-pair-years, with the variable of interest
for this chapter will be the log of exports, which are recorded for both countries in a
pair.
Trade data comes from version 4 of the Correlates of War Trade Dataset, which is
based on the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics and has bilateral trade flows for 205
countries over the period 1945 to 2005. This data is used because the COW trade
data distinguishes between reported zeroes and dates where there is missing data/no
trade reports in a given year. Because this analysis is concerned with trade sanctions
it is expected that at least some of the time trade should be reduced to zero, and so
the distinction between zero reported trade and no reported trade is important.
Trade diversion is also measured from this trade data, by the creation of dummy
variables for countries that were the top 10 buyers/suppliers of a target nation the
year prior to a sanction that also did not get involved in the sanction regime. In order
to give an idea of how important increases in trade to these third party countries are,
total imports/exports to these countries during sanction events are summed and then
divided by the target nation’s GDP. Summary statistics for this are given in Table
2.2.
Data on sanctions comes from version 4.0 of the Threat and Imposition of Eco-
nomic Sanctions (TIES) dataset, which scans legislation, government documents and
proceedings and news articles to capture as many sanction threats and events as pos-
sible which began between 1945 and 2005. The dataset includes data as recent as
2013, however new sanctions stop being added after 2005 and so I use that as the
end date for my data. In order to further remove as much endogeniety as possible I
exclude all sanction events that are explicitly stated to concern trade disputes. More
information about the coding and construction of the TIES dataset used here can be
found in the Data Appendix.
Due to some of the categories of sanction being rare and to be more in line with
previous literature the primary analysis will aggregate the 9 sanction categories into 3.
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These are intense sanctions (blockades and embargoes), moderate sanctions (partial
embargoes, import restrictions and export restrictions) and light sanctions (travel
bans, suspension of economic agreements, removal of foreign aid and asset freezes).
Finally, data on economic integration is taken from the National Science Foundation-
Kellog Institute Database on Economic Integration Agreements. Covering 195 coun-
tries from 1950-2012, the higher a country-pair’s EIA score the more integrated the
two economies are, with 0 being no trade agreement, 3 being a free trade agreement
and 6 being a full economic union with a single monetary, fiscal and immigration
policy.
2.4 Direct Impact of Sanctions and Threats
I will begin by setting up a gravity model of exports (Ei,j,t) from the exporting country
(i) to the importing country (j) in year (t). I capture all trade flows by including
country pairs (exports from country A to B) and the reverse (exports from country B
to country A), which forms my variable Exports. The log of exports is my dependent
variable for this analysis. In order to keep the observed zeroes in the trade data when
taking the natural log, any zero is converted to 1$.
The first regression will be the baseline model, looking at the effect of imposed
sanctions and sanction threats on trade between the sanctioner-target pair. The
model itself will be a bilateral panel gravity equation using logged exports as the de-
pendent variable, indicator variables for the presence of sanctions or sanction threats,
and country-year and country-pair fixed effects. These fixed effects will capture coun-
try characteristics, multilateral resistance as described by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) and as discussed previously will help account for government policy shocks in
the trade partners. The model to be estimated is given by:
lnEi,j,t = αi,j + αi,t + αj,t + EIAi,j,t + β1S
X
i,j,t + β2S
M
i,j,t (2.1)
+β3T
X
i,j,t + β4T
M
i,j,t + i,j,t
where Ei,j,t is the logged real value of exports and αi,j are country-pair fixed effects and
αi,t / αj,t are country-year fixed effects for the exporter i / importer j, respectively.
EIA is a variable measuring the level of economic integration and trade freedoms
between the two countries. The error term for a given country-pair year is given by
i,j,t.
The variable SXi,j,t is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the ex-
porting country i is imposing some type of economic sanction against the importing
country j during a given year t. A negative coefficient on SXi,j,t (β1) indicates that a
country’s exports to a country it is targeting decreases as a result of the sanctions,
and therefor sanctions are generally successful. A positive β1 would indicate that a
country exports more to a country it is targeting with economic sanctions, which goes
against intuition.
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The inverse of this situation is Mi,j,t, an indicator variable which takes the value of
1 if the importing country j is imposing an economic sanction against the exporting
country i. A negative coefficient on SMi,j,t (β2) indicates a reduction in imports from
a country being sanctioned to the country imposing the sanctions, indicating that
sanctions are generally effective at reducing imports from targeted nations. A positive
β2 would indicate that sanctions generally increase imports from a country under
sanctions, the opposite of the intended policy goal.
In addition to variables for imposed sanctions, TXi,j,t is an indicator variable which
take the value of 1 if the exporting country i is threatening to impose economic
sanctions on the importing country j in year t. The coefficient on TXi,j,t (β3) measures
how exports from the threatening country to the target country change as a result of
an economic sanction threat. A positive coefficient on β3 would indicate that exports
from the threatening country increases during a threat period, supporting the theory
that the targeted country will attempt to stockpile goods from the threatening nation.
A negative coefficient on β3 would indicate the opposite, that a targeted country will
preemptively stop purchasing goods from a country that is threatening it.
The inverse of this is TMi,j,t, and indicator variable which take the value of 1 if the
importing country j is threatening economic sanctions against the exporting country
i. The coefficient on TMi,j,t (β4) measures how imports into the threatening country
change as a result of the economic sanction threat. A positive coefficient on β4
indicates firms and citizens in the threatening country try to stockpile goods from
the target country before potential sanctions go into effect. A negative coefficient on
β4 indicates that firms and citizens in the threatening country tend to preemptively
comply with potential future sanctions, or that firms in the target country stop selling
to the threatening country before sanctions are in place.
The results of this regression are given in Table 2.3. I find that exporter imposed
sanctions have no statistically significant impact on exports to the target country,
indicating that the sanctioning country either does not significantly restrict sales to
the target country or is unsuccessful in enforcing the sanction. Importer imposed
sanctions by comparison have a significant impact, reducing imports from the target
country i to the sanctioning country j by 51.37% on average, significant at the 1%
level. Taken together this indicates that countries are more stringent or more suc-
cessful at restricting goods coming into their country compared to restricting goods
leaving their country. The sign and magnitude of the coefficient for importer imposed
sanctions, -0.721, is comparable in sign and magnitude to the disruption in bilateral
trade flows found by Caruso (2005), the prior analysis closest to my methodology,
who found that intense sanctions reduced trade between the United States and its
sanction target by a coefficient of -0.89.
The pattern is reversed for sanction threats, where importer threats are not statis-
tically significant, while exporter threats are. When the exporting country threatens
sanctions, it leads to a 43.19% increase in sales to the threatened country, significant
at the 1% level. An importer threatening to restrict goods coming into their country
is not taken as seriously by firms and consumers compared to an exporter threatening
to restrict sales. This gives evidence for stockpiling behavior when the exporter is
threatening sanctions, with firms and consumers increasing purchases in expectation
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that the market may be closed in the near future.
This only examines the direct impact that sanctions and threats have on the
sanctioner-target pair however. Target countries can react to a sanction or threat
by increasing trade with third party countries, which would lessen the impact of the
actual sanction. Failing to account for this will lead to an inflated measure of the
damage sanctions cause.
2.5 Sanctions and Trade Diversion
In order to capture the effect of exporters under a sanction attempting to find new
customers and the effect of importers under sanction looking for new sources of goods,
two indicator variables are created. These indicator variables track the third party
countries not involved in the sanction regime that were the target nation’s largest
trading partners before the sanction regime began.
The key assumption that I make in this process is that the majority of trade
diversion will be directed to the target country’s largest trade partners. I assume
that measuring how trade with these large third party trade partners change during
sanction events will give an accurate assessment of the amount of trade diversion
occurring overall. This is because there are network effects that tie the target nation
to larger trade partners compared to less important trade partners. Large trade
partners are more likely to have trade infrastructure available for use, and there
would be firm and individual relationships that would make ramping up trade easier
compared to “creating” a new major trade relationship. This means that the implicit
control group for this analysis are smaller third party trade partners, whose trade
flows should not react as strongly to the presence of a sanction.
The threat of trade diversion is a primary reason that countries try to build
multilateral sanction regimes. The more third party countries agree to the sanction
regime, the less flexibility targets have to react to sanctions and the more damaging
those sanctions will be. Similarly, a country that is being threatened with sanctions
can preemptively react to those threats by diverting trade to third party countries.
Accounting for this preemptive action is important to determining the true amount
of trade diversion, which might be understated if you don’t include prior actions.
To analyze this the baseline regression is modified with buyer/supplier diversion
variables for imposed sanctions and threatened sanctions:
lnEi,j,t = αi,j + αi,t + αj,t + β1S
X
i,j,t + β2S
M
i,j,t + β3T
X
i,j,t + β4T
M
i,j,t (2.2)
+β5SDi,t + β6BDi,j,t + β7TSDi,j,t + β8TBDi,j,t + i,j,t
Where the variables remain the same as equation 2.1, with the addition of four di-
version variables. Supplier diversion, or the tendency for countries under an exporter
imposed sanction to seek new sources for importers, is given by SDi,j,t. This is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 during the sanction event for the top 10
exporters (i) to the target country (j) in the year prior to the start of the sanction
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event that also did not participate in the sanction regime. In effect this tracks how
trade behaves for the largest trade partners going into the sanction event that did
not participate, the countries most likely to engage in sanction busting behavior. The
coefficient on this variable β5 is therefor a measure of how well the target country can
divert its import needs to its largest available suppliers. A positive result indicates
that imports from important third party trade partners increases during sanction
events, giving evidence of trade diversion.
The same is true for buyer diversion, the tendency for countries under an importer
imposed sanction to seek new markets for its goods to make up for the lost customers
in the sanctioning country. This is explained by SDi,j,t, which takes the value of 1
during the sanction event for the top 10 importers (j) from the target country (i) in
the year prior to the sanction event beginning that did not participate in the sanction
regime. A positive coefficient on this variable would indicate a country is successful
in diverting its goods to open markets after sanctions are imposed.
Two equivalent variables are created for threat cases. Supplier diversion caused by
sanction threats is given by TSDi,j,t and buyer diversion caused by sanction threats
is given by TBDi,j,t. Positive coefficients on these variables would indicate that
countries preemptively seek new sources of goods/new markets for their goods when
a sanction is threatened. Accounting for this preemptive action is important both
because of its implications for sanction success and also to find the true level of
sanction diversion during a sanction event.
The results are reported in Table 2.4. I find that the results from the first regres-
sion are robust to the inclusion of these diversion variables, with only small changes
in magnitude being observed.
The coefficient on supplier sanction diversion indicates that imports from the
10 largest suppliers to a country not involved with the sanction event increases by
55.43%, significant at the 1% significance level. Similarly, the coefficient on buyer
sanction diversion indicates that sales to the 10 largest markets not involved with the
sanction event increases by 49.78%, significant at the 1% level. To provide context,
I have added together the trade flows of the top 10 third party trade partners, and
divided this sum by the GDP in the target nation. Summary information can be
found on this statistic in 2.2. Taken together with the coefficient estimates, the
average target country will increase sales to its largest third party customers by an
amount equivalent to 6.7% of the target state’s GDP. Imports from the average target
nation’s largest suppliers increases by a similar amount, equivalent to 7.98% of the
target country’s GDP.
These increases in trade flows to the largest trade partners that did not participate
in the sanction regime indicate that countries are successful at replacing at least part
of their normal imports and exports by finding new buyers and suppliers.
The coefficient on supplier threat diversion is also statistically significant, indicat-
ing that imports from a country’s largest third party suppliers increases by 42.05%
during a sanction threat, significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on buyer threat
diversion indicates an increase in sales to third party markets of 42.76% during sanc-
tion events, significant at the 1% level.
Finally, the coefficient estimates of the direct impact of sanctions and sanction
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threats are not significantly affected by the inclusion of trade diversion variables.
There is no indication that the coefficient estimates were being biased by not ac-
counting for this trade diversion phenomenon.
On the whole this gives strong evidence that not only does trade diversion exist,
but it is generally prevalent and also occurs before sanctions are actually imposed.
During sanction threats, trade with other countries not involved with the sanction
events increases both for importer imposed sanctions and exporter imposed sanctions.
The pattern in the increases indicates that based on the magnitude, countries begin
diversifying their markets in response to threats, and that this continues on if the
sanction is actually imposed. The size of this market shift is equivalent to 6-8% of
the target nation’s GDP for both imports and exports.
2.6 Heterogeneous Sanctions and Trade Diversion
The final step in this analysis is to examine whether or not these results are being
driven by a particular category/severity of sanctions. Theoretically a more intense
sanction would result in a greater direct disruption in trade flows, but also an increase
in trade diversion as there is a greater market distortion for third parties to take
advantage of. On the other hand there might be political pressure during intense
sanctions that will make third party countries hesitate from trading with the target.
This pressure would logically not be there during lighter sanctions which are not
pursued with the same commitment as intense sanctions.
To analyze this question, I use a modified version of equation 2.2:
lnEi,j,t = αi,j + αi,t + αj,t + β1S
X(L,M,I)
i,j,t + β2S
M(L,M,I)
i,j,t + β3T
X(L,M,I)
i,j,t + β4T
M(L,M,I)
i,j,t
(2.3)
+β5SD
L,M,I
i,t + β6BD
L,M,I
i,j,t + β7TSD
L,M,I
i,j,t + β8TBD
L,M,I
i,j,t + i,j,t
where the variables are the same as in equation 2.2, but instead of single variables each
is a vector of variables depending on whether the sanction being imposed/threatened
is a light, moderate or intense sanction. For each variable there will be three coef-
ficients, one for each case. It is expected that intense sanctions and threats should
have a more negative impact on trade between the sanctioner and target country,
while moderate and light sanctions should have progressively smaller effects. A sim-
ilar pattern is expected for diversion and threat diversion. Trade should be diverted
to third party countries in greater amounts for intense sanctions and threats, while
light sanctions may not greatly affect trade flows at all.
Results are given in Table 2.5. Of note, the two columns of the table both relate
to the same regression estimate. The first column gives the coefficient results for
an imposed sanction of the given intensity or trade diversion as a result of those
sanctions. The second column does the same for sanction threats.
When dividing the threat division variable into intense, moderate and light the
coefficients lose individual significance. So it seems that sanction threats do change
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trade flows, but I cannot distinguish the individual impact of intense, moderate and
light threats. The trade disruption caused by imposed sanctions is easier to see.
The coefficient on intense buyer diversion is 2.432, corresponding to an increase of
1038.16%. However this is only significant at the 10% significance level, and the dis-
tribution indicates that it is positive, but imprecisely estimated. In terms of supplier
diversion, it is moderate supplier diversion which is statistically significant at the
10% level, corresponding to a 69.72% increase. However this is not interpreted as
moderate sanctions causing more supplier diversion, but rather that it is difficult to
differentiate individual coefficients from one another. The pattern is maintained with
the largest magnitudes generally going to intense sanctions and threats, while lighter
sanctions have impacts that are statistically zero and economically small.
In terms of threatened sanctions it is exporter sanctions that are statistically
significant. Both intense exporter sanctions and intense importer sanctions are asso-
ciated with large, positive relationships that are significant at the 5% level. Intense
exporter sanctions have a coefficient of 1.63, while intense importer sanctions have
a coefficient of 2.635. For threatened sanctions it is much more clear cut that in-
tense sanctions threats cause a preemptive movement from the target nation, while
moderate and light sanctions do not. This gives evidence that the results for sanc-
tion threats before were primarily caused by nations attempting to preempt intense
sanctions.
2.7 Conclusion
The major policy question that this chapter analyzes is whether it is important to
form multilateral coalitions, in order to avoid situations where target states can avoid
some or most of the pain of economic sanctions by diverting their trade to alternate
markets. This result is confirmed, as there is strong evidence that sanctions do cause
trade to be diverted to third party countries. This is in line with Allen (2019), which
examined how targeted governments reacted in terms of civil rights during a sanction
event. I found there that the greater the sanctioning nations trade was as a percent
of the target nation’s GDP, the more disruption those sanctions caused and the more
oppressive the regimes became in response.
This chapter explains that result clearly, because if you do not actually get a large
percentage of a nation’s trade partners on board with the sanction, those nations will
maintain their economic position through the use of third party trade. Moreover the
trade diversion found in this paper is both economically and statistically significant,
equivalent to approximately 6-8% of the target nation’s GDP on average.
I also examine how these results change when examined in terms of heterogeneous
sanctions. I find that generally importer sanctions are more significant and relevant,
in line with the aggregated case. The intense buyer diversion for imposed sanctions
and moderate supplier diversion both give additional credence that there is real trade
diversion from imposed sanctions. In addition it is confirmed that it is intense sanction
threats, both in terms of importer imposed and exporter imposed, that cause people
to react directly. However there is no strong evidence of third party trade diversion
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from threats, despite the strong result earlier. This seems to indicate that again we
cannot differentiate these coefficients from one another.
I contribute to the literature in two ways. First I use the top 10 trade partners
going into a sanction as a proxy for trade diversion more generally. This first allows
me to study trade diversion no matter if the major trade partners are part of some
kind of special group like the EU or not. More importantly though using a subset
of the major trade partners allows for the use of country-year and country-pair fixed
effects, which control for country characteristics as well policy shocks and government
actions in the target nation. This allows me to at least partially control for the
selection problem inherent in studying trade and sanctions, where the decision to
impose an economic sanction is not exogenous to trade. Based on this I conclude
that I have detected trade diversion, both because of imposed sanctions but also that
threats of intense sanctions can cause target nations to begin adjusting their trade
patterns to try and avoid a hard shock when or if a sanction is actually imposed.
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2.8 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Sanction Descriptions
Sanction Type Description Imposed Cases
Blockade Imposer attempts to prevent all
countries from economic interac-
tions with target country.
37
Embargo Imposer cuts all economic activity
between itself and the target.
51
Partial Embargo Imposer cuts economic activity in
certain sectors with the target
country.
118
Import Restriction Imposer restricts imports from the
target country.
447
Export Restriction Imposer restricts exports to the tar-
get country.
58
Withdrawal from EA. Imposer withdraws from previously
negotiated economic arrangements.
55
Asset Freeze Imposer seizes all or part of the tar-
get state’s assets in the imposing
country’s jurisdiction.
34
Reduction in Foreign Aid Imposer reduces or terminates for-
eign aid to the target country.
191
Travel Ban Imposer bans travel to and from the
target country, either in general or
for specific individuals.
55
This table is based on the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions categories.
The number of imposed sanction events are reported in the third column.
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Table 2.2: Trade with Top 10 Partners as % of GDP
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sales to Third Party (% GDP) 12.23% 11.65 0.001% 89.12%
Purchases from Third Party (% GDP) 16.05% 50.52 0.08% 915.12%
This table reports summary statistics for trade diversion to
the top 10 trade partners not involved in a sanction during a
given year. By adding up total sales to / purchases from those
third parties and dividing by the target nation’s GDP a percent
measure of how important with those alternate trading partners
is to the target country. The largest examples for sales are major
export economies such as Congo, Ireland and Malaysia.
The largest example for purchases is Liberia in the 2000-2003
which suffered a civil war, collapsing the domestic economy.
Results are reported as a percent of GDP.
Table 2.3: Threatened and Imposed Sanctions
Ln(Exports) (1)
Exporter Imposed San. -0.138
(0.160)
Importer Imposed San. -0.721***
(0.181)
Exporter Threatened San. 0.359***
(0.119)
Importer Threatened San. 0.134
(0.145)
Economic Integration 0.00262***
(0.000475)
Observations 852,469
R-squared 0.757
Regression includes country-pair and country-year fixed effects.
Country Pair Clustered Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Trade Diversion from Sanctions and Threats
Ln(Exports) (1)
Exporter Imposed San. -0.205
(0.161)
Importer Imposed San. -0.773***
(0.179)
Exporter Threatened San. 0.235*
(0.122)
Importer Threatened San. 0.014
(0.145)
Supplier San. Diversion 0.441***
(0.079)
Buyer San. Diversion 0.404***
(0.081)
Supplier Threat Diversion 0.356***
(0.063)
Buyer Threat Diversion 0.352***
(0.066)
Economic Integration 0.00262***
(0.000475)
Observations 852,469
R-squared 0.748
Regression includes country-pair and country-year fixed effects.
Country Pair Clustered Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneous Threat Diversion
Imposed Sanctions Threatened Sanctions
Intense Exporter San. -1.040 1.630**
(0.867) (0.740)
Moderate Exporter San. -0.105 0.248
(0.224) (0.178)
Light Exporter San. -0.0590 0.491
(0.325) (0.305)
Intense Importer San. -1.978** 2.635**
(0.905) (1.038)
Moderate Importer San. -0.741*** -0.110
(0.236) (0.199)
Light Importer San. -0.0277 0.141
(0.337) (0.314)
Intense Buyer Div. 2.432* -1.565
(1.449) (1.749)
Moderate Buyer Div. 0.428 0.230
(0.385) (0.257)
Light Buyer Div. -0.293 -0.0801
(0.396) (0.355)
Intense Supplier Div. 1.616 -1.270
(1.053) (1.167)
Moderate Supplier Div. 0.529* -0.135
(0.310) (0.240)
Light Supplier Div. -0.201 -0.352
(0.346) (0.313)
Economic Integration 0.00262***
(0.000475)
Observations 852,469
R-squared 0.757
This table presents the results of a single regression, with coefficients
corresponding to imposed sanctions or trade diversion presented in
the first column, and coefficients corresponding to threatened sanctions
or threat diversion are presented in the second column.
Regression includes country-pair and country-year fixed effects.
Country Pair Clustered Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.9 Data Appendix
The TIES dataset divides imposed and threatened sanctions into 10 categories, of
which I make use of 9. These sanctions are summarized in Table 2.1. The tenth
category which I exclude here is a generic “other” category for cases which don’t fit
into any of the other designations. Because of the unusual nature of these events,
and because there are only five such events in the dataset they are dropped from the
analysis. Sanction threats have an additional “unspecified” threat category which is
not analyzed here. Data is reported in terms of “sanction cases,” defined as all of the
sanctions imposed or threatened by a country or group of countries on a target over
a specific issue, which are transformed into a set of panel dummy variables for each
type of threatened or imposed sanction
A limitation this imposes is that the data does not report data on the timeline
of when specific sanctions or threats are made. Instead the dataset reports when a
sanctioncase begins and ends. If a sanction regime starts as a travel ban, leads to
import restrictions and later becomes an embargo the sanction case would begin at
the imposition of the travel ban and end when the embargo is lifted. Dummy variables
for travel ban, import restrictions and embargoes associated with that sanction case
and would all be coded 1 for the entire sanction case duration.
For a modern example, we can examine the recent sanctions against Iran. The
United States and others have instituted numerous sanctions against Iran because of
its nuclear weapon program over a period of years. All of those sanctions relating to
Iran’s nuclear program would be counted as a single sanction case. The United States
also have sanctions against Iran for other actions in the region, such as its support
for rebels, terrorist organizations and other groups. These foreign policy sanctions
are unrelated to the issue of nuclear weapons, and thus would constitute a separate
sanction case.
In order to avoid potential problems of endogeneity, sanctions which are threat-
ened or imposed due to trade or factors relating to trade are removed from the dataset
for a total of 671 sanction cases. Of these 503 involved threats of sanctions while 398
cases resulted in sanctions actually being imposed. There are 273 sanction cases
which end at the threat stage with no sanction being imposed and there are 168 cases
of sanctions being imposed with little or no threat or warning before it.
The average duration of a sanction case is 4.2 years while sanction cases that lead
to sanctions being imposed are slightly longer, averaging 4.6 years, with maximum
duration varying drastically. Some sanction cases last only a few months, while other
cases like the United State’s embargo of Cuba span nearly the entire dataset, with a
maximum duration of 46 years.
Copyright c© Kevin Allen, 2019.
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Chapter 3 Detecting Cheating During Economic Sanctions
3.1 Introduction
Economic sanctions are foreign policy tools meant to inflict economic harm against a
country or governments in order to affect their foreign or domestic policies. In order
to be effective it is necessary for the sanctions to be adhered to, as even relatively
small actions that undercut a sanction regime can give enough relief to change the
marginal decision from giving in to the sanctioner’s demands to resisting the sanc-
tion. Blatant sanction dodging can also communicate a lack of commitment to the
sanctions, making them ineffective even if there is significant damage being caused
to the target economy.
North Korea is a modern example where sanction regimes are theoretically very
restrictive, but there are allegations that China does not actually enforce the economic
sanctions it has imposed on North Korea. Since China is overwhelmingly North
Korea’s largest trading partner, if there is sanction dodging between China and North
Korea the entire international sanction regime is ultimately ineffective.(Klein, 2018)
Another example include firms and countries going around their own sanctions against
Iran over its nuclear program, in particular purchasing Iranian oil in violation of UN
sanctions.(Gladstone, 2014)
Being able to detect this sort of cheating is therefor important for countries who
wish to maintain pressure on targeted countries to ensure the sanction is actually
achieving its stated goals. This chapter contributes to the literature by using taking
advantage of the different incentives for actors in the sanctioning country compared
to the target country to detect the presence of sanction dodging or some alteration
in reporting behavior. A firm in the country imposing the sanctions faces far more
scrutiny and penalties for dodging the sanction and being caught, as they are more
directly under the jurisdiction of the sanctioner. Conversely, firms and individuals in
the target country have much less need to hide their activities from the perspective
that being caught is much less likely to lead to penalties, and might lead to an im-
provement in reputation as heroes attempting to subvert hostile actions from foreign
governments.
This difference in reporting incentives could lead to changes in reporting behavior
based on whether the reporter is in the country imposing the sanction versus the
country being targeted by a sanction. A firm in the sanctioning country will attempt
to hide its trade with the target country, to avoid penalties from the government. A
systematic change in difference between what one country reports as exports and its
trade partner reports as imports during a sanction event could be evidence of firms
cheating during the sanctions.
There is a natural difference between what one country reports as exports, which
are typically measured “Free on Board” (FOB) versus imports which are reported
“Cost, Insurance and Freight” (CIF). Free on board measures of trade include the
value of the item being transported and the cost of moving the goods onto the trans-
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port. In contrast CIF trade measures include the value of the item being transported,
the cost of moving the goods onto the transport and also the cost of transporting the
goods to the destination country. This includes shipping costs and insurance fees.
Over time the difference between FOB exports and CIF imports should be relatively
constant between countries, as distance between countries and general cost of insur-
ing don’t change. This means that a statistically significant increase or decrease in
the difference between one country’s exports and the others reported imports during
a sanction event is evidence that there is either sanction cheating or at least a change
in reporting behavior.
Section 2 gives an overview of other chapters that have studied the topic of sanc-
tion busting and cheating in the literature. Section 3 of the chapter describes the data
used to analyze the difference between exports and reported imports during sanction
events and how these things are measured.
Section 4 uses a panel-gravity approach to estimate the average impact on the
difference between exports and reported imports as a result of imposed sanction
events. I find that during an importer imposed sanction event, the gap between
logged imports and reported exports decreases by an average of 9.39%, significant
at the 5% level. During exporter imposed sanction events the sign is reversed, with
the gap growing 7.75%, significant at the 5% level. Both of these are consistent
with sanction cheating based on the different incentives and penalties faced by firms
depending on whether they are in the country imposing the sanction or not.
Also in Section 4 is an analysis of how reporting behavior changed based on hetero-
geneous sanction types being imposed. I find that based on the coefficient estimates,
the more intense the sanction the greater the change in reporting behavior. The signs
of the coefficients are all consistent with the same sanction cheating behavior when
using aggregated sanction dummies. The coefficients for importer imposed sanctions
are not individually significant, but are jointly significant. Intense exporter sanctions
are associated with an average 28.02% increase in the gap between reported log im-
ports and log exports, significant at the 5% level. In general this is additional support
for the observed change in reporting behavior consistent with sanction cheating.
Section 5 and Section 6 analyze whether there is a change in reporting behavior
during sanction threats or with third-party countries not directly involved in the
sanction. Since there is no change in reporting behavior detected during sanction
threats or with third party nations, there is stronger evidence that the results of the
previous section are because of a change in reporting behavior related to the legality
of trade between the sanctioner-target pair and not some unrelated third factor.
Section 7 uses the procedure developed to examine how firms in the United States
behave during sanction events in particular. I find that when the United States im-
poses sanctions on another country, there is no evidence of cheating by firms exporting
to the targeted nation. However there is a change in the reporting behavior of firms
importing from the targeted nation that indicates that there is cheating by American
firms.
Section 8 is conclusion and discussion of the results. Finally, Section 9 contains
the tables of results.
56
3.2 Literature: Sanction Busting and Cheating
Sanction cheating is explored in several chapters in the literature, but typically in
terms of third party countries coming in to take up the slack caused by sanction
events. Drezner (2000) studies the issue of multilateral sanctions as a cooperation
problem, and finds that third party countries are likely to engage in sanction busting
when there is not a strong enforcement mechanism to force compliance with the
sanction regime. A similar result is found by Early (2009), which examines whether
a sanctioning country’s allies step in to take advantage of the disruption caused be a
sanction by increasing their trade. They find that the United State’s allies are most
likely to bust a sanction regime by trading with the targeted country, likely using the
alliance as a cover for commercial gain.
The question of sanction busting by firms and individuals was studied in the con-
text of the Chinese sanction against Norwegian salmon is studied by Chen and Garcia
(2016). The chapter finds that this sanction did cause market distortions, but found
evidence that individuals evaded the sanctions by rerouting, smuggling and other
activities related to black market trading. Another example of a chapter that stud-
ies whether firms in the sanctioning country or countries engage in sanction busting
behavior is Vigna and Ferrara (2010), which studies arms embargo violations using
stock prices. By studying random shocks in conflict intensity, such as major victories
by the rebels or regime forces, they find that shocks that indicated an increase in
conflict intensity led to increased stock prices for certain arms companies, indicating
that there might have been insider knowledge about those companies subverting the
embargo.
To study the question of sanction cheating more broadly I will follow Kellenberg
and Levinson (2016), which used systematic differences between Country A’s reported
exports and Country B’s reported imports to find evidence of cheating during changes
to tariff regimes. Because sanctions are essentially extreme forms of tariffs it is
consistent to use this methodology to examine whether there is similar cheating during
sanction events.
In effect what I wish to see is the behavior of firms during sanction events, to see
how common it is for there to be cheating during sanction events. Since that is not
possible to observe directly, I will use the difference in reported trade flows to act
as an indicator for it. As in Kellenberg and Levinson (2016) I will have a gravity
equation that accounts for the primary determinants of reporting, with a treatment
variable in the form of a sanction dummy. By comparing the sign and magnitude
of the coefficient on sanction dummy to which direction the sanction is going, I will
be able to say that there is a change in reporting behavior consistent with sanction
cheating.
3.3 Data
The dataset used in this chapter is an imbalanced panel based on the IMF’s Direc-
tion of Trade Statistics (DOTS). This is combined with sanctions data defined by the
Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. The combined dataset con-
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tains information on 175 countries over the period 1950-2005, with a total of 16,180
country pairs. The total combined sample size of 282,625 country-pair-years
The dependent variable in this dataset comes from the IMF’s Direction of Trade
Statistics (DOTS). The Direction of Trade Statistics dataset is a bilateral panel
dataset covers 236 countries and territories over the period from 1948 to 2016. It
includes data on what each country reports as exports and what their trade partners
report as imports, and the reverse. The primary dependent variable from this is the
difference between the natural log of what country A reported as their imports and
the natural log of what country B reported as their exports. Summary statistics for
this data can be found in Table 3.3.
Data on sanctions comes from version 4 of the Threat and Imposition of Economic
Sanctions database. This dataset covers sanctions beginning during the period from
1945 to 2005 by examining government documents, legal documents and news reports.
It covers sanctions imposed by any country on any other country, to generate as
complete a dataset as possible.
The categories of sanctions are described in Table 3.1. I omit miscellaneous
“other” sanction events that don’t fit into any of the other 9 sanction categories
because there are only 5 such events and there is little connection between them. In
order to avoid as much endogeneity as possible I also exclude those sanctions which
are directly related to trade disputes or trade wars.
Because some categories are small, when examining the impact of heterogeneous
sanctions these categories are aggregated into intense (blockades and embargoes),
moderate (partial embargoes, import restrictions and export restrictions) and light
(travel bans, asset freezes, suspension of economic agreement and termination of
foreign aid). Summary statistics for the number of sanction observations can be
found in Table 3.2.
All sanctions threatened and imposed on a country over a specific geopolitical
issue are grouped together into a “sanction case,” which is how the TIES dataset is
reported. However this does impose a limit on accuracy because if a sanction case
begins with a travel ban and ends with an embargo, it is counted as if the travel ban
and embargo were imposed concurrently for the entire duration. 1 However there
is clear information that differentiates the threat stage of a sanction event from the
imposed stage.
On average a sanction case lasts 4.2 years, while including those cases which did
not go past the threat stage. Counting only sanction cases where sanctions were
imposed, the average duration is slightly larger at 4.6 years. The shortest sanction
cases last less than a year, but certain sanctions where both sides reach a political
stalemate can last decades, such as the American embargo against Cuba. The longest
duration measured for a sanction is 46 years.
Data on the level of economic integration between two countries, including free
trade agreements, customs unions and common markets are given by the National
1For an example of what this means, all of the sanctions that the United States and the United
Nations imposed against Iran over their nuclear program are counted as a single sanction case,
meaning that the dates for when the asset freezes, oil embargoes and other sanctions were imposed
is not found in the dataset.
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Science Foundation-Kellog Institute Database on Economic Integration Agreements.
This dataset covers 195 countries from 1950-2012, and measures the level of economic
integration between country pairs during a given year on a 0-6 scale, with 0 indicating
no trade agreement and 6 indicating a full economic union with unified monetary,
fiscal and immigration systems. Free trade agreements are ranked at 3, in the center
of the scale.
3.4 Detecting Sanction Cheating
To detect the presence of cheating, I follow Kellenberg and Levinson (2016) by us-
ing the difference between one country’s imports and the partner country’s exports.
This difference should be positive on average, because typically the reported value of
imports is higher than the corresponding reported value of exports. This is because
imports are reported in Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF), which include the value
of the goods being transported in addition to the cost of loading the goods onto a
transport, the cost of shipping and any insurance or fees paid to get the goods to
the target country. Exports are typically reported Free on Board (FOB) which only
include the value of the goods being transported and the cost of moving those goods
onto a transport. Both of these are “Incoterms” defined by the International Cham-
ber of Commerce as approved rules of trade, which defines CIF trade as a situation
where the seller is responsible for costs of delivering goods to the transport as well
as the costs of bringing the goods to the destination country, along with insurance
fees to cover the risk of loss or damage during transportation. All of these additional
costs added to the value of reported imports explain why they are typically higher
than reported exports.
This difference should be relatively stable over time, as transport costs depend
heavily on distance traveled and loading costs which are determined by infrastruc-
ture. Insurance costs are aimed at covering damage during transport which primarily
occur because of weather or shipboard operations, both of which should not change
dramatically for a given transport route.
During a sanction event there are different penalties for being caught depending on
which country a firm is located in that could lead to the difference between reported
imports and exports to change. In the country imposing the sanction, being caught
breaking the sanction will be harshly punished, because it is breaking a law set by
the government and providing aid to a geopolitical rival. Even in terms of public
perception, being caught purchasing Iranian oil in the United States would have
major repercussions for the public image of the firm. Thus there is incentive to stop
trading with the target of the sanction, or at least to stop reporting imports from the
target.
Conversely, being caught breaking the sanction in the targeted country will likely
be met with little punishment or even positive support. The sanction is something
being imposed on the target, not a domestic policy. Because of this, being caught
trading with the sanctioning country is much less likely to be punished, and might
even be supported by the targeted government as a form of resisting the foreign
influence. Therefore there is less need to hide trade flows in the target nation, because
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those firms do not face personal risk of prosecution or negative public perception in
their own country.
The first regression examines the difference between country i’s reported log ex-
ports and country j’s reported log imports, with the variables of interest being the
presence of an exporter or importer imposed sanction.
ln(M)i,j,t − ln(X)i,j,t = αi,j + αi,t + αj,t + β1SXi,j,t + β2SMi,j,t + β3EIAi,j,t + i,j,t (3.1)
where ln(M)i,j,t is natural log of country i’s reported imports from country j and
ln(X)i,j,t is the natural log of country j’s reported exports to country i during time
period t. To control for distance and other fixed trade costs between countries I
include time invariant country pair fixed effects, αi,j. This also captures the general
importance of trade between two given countries and a measure of how important
their long-term geopolitical relationship is. I use country-year fixed effects αj,t and
αi,t that will capture increases in transport fees and insurance costs caused by policy
shocks or government actions. This will at least partially control for those policies
and shocks that increases tension between countries and adds uncertainty to the
international market. To capture an important time-varying trade policy between
countries I use the NSF-Kellogg Institute level of Economic Integration Agreement,
EIAi,j,t. Sanctions are captured by S
X
i,j,t, a dummy variable which takes the value of
1 when country i is imposing some kind of sanction on country j. Importer imposed
sanctions are captured by SMi,j,t, which takes the value of 1 when country j is imposing
some kind of sanction on country i.
Sanction cheating, or at least changes in reporting behavior will be represented
by a statistically significant coefficient on the sanction variables of the regression.
As discussed previously, firms in the sanctioning country have greater incentive to
hide their true trade flows to avoid prosecution and penalties, while firms in the
target country have much less direct risk from being caught subverting the sanction
regime. Taking that difference in risk into account, if the sanction is being imposed by
the importing country, the coefficient is expected to be negative. Because reported
imports are expected to decrease more than the reported exports, the difference
between imports and exports will shrink. Conversely, if the exporting country is
imposing the sanction the coefficient is expected to be positive. The natural difference
between imports and reported imports will grow larger, as firms in the exporting
country hide or misreport their trade flows while firms in the importing country do
not face as much direct consequence for being caught.
The results are found in Column 1 of Table 3.4, which supports the hypothesis that
reporting behavior changes based on the origin of the sanction policy. If there is an
importer imposed sanction, the coefficient of -0.0986 indicates the difference between
exports and reported imports decreases by approximately 9.86%, significant at the
5% level. For comparison in Kellenberg and Levinson (2016) they study the change
in reporting behavior because of increases in importer tariffs. Looking at their model
with country-year fixed effects which is the closest to the model used here, they found
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that importer tariffs had a coefficient of -1.22. Although much larger, their variable
of interest is a weighted level of tariffs rather than a dummy variable. Given the
standard deviation of their tariff variable is 0.04, the presence of any kind of sanction
results in the same change in reporting behavior as a two standard deviation increase
in tariffs. For a country pair with the mean difference between log imports and log
exports of 0.174, the presence of an importer imposed sanction would decrease the
gap by more than half. This provides strong evidence that there is a major change in
reporting behavior in line with the theory that firms in the sanctioning country hide
their true trade flows more than firms in the target country.
Similarly, exporter imposed sanctions has a coefficient of 0.0746 indicating that
difference in that country’s exports and the targeted country’s imports increases by
approximately 7.46%, which is significant at the 5% level. This is again in line with
the previous theory that firm location matters for reporting behavior. In this case
the firms in the exporting country have greater incentive to hide their true trade
flows. This results in the difference between reported imports and exports increasing,
matching the prediction made previously.
Thus there is strong support that there is sanction cheating, or at least changes in
reporting behavior that would indicate cheating, in line with the different reporting
incentives described. Both of these results are robust to the exclusion of the top 1%
and bottom 1% of log difference results, indicating that this is not being driven by
outliers in the data.
Cheating during Heterogeneous Sanctions
As an additional confirmation the same tests are done, but with sanctions split into
three tiers for intense, moderate and light sanctions. In theory the more intense a
sanction event is, the more incentive there is to cheat and take advantage of the
market distortion. But there is also greater danger in subverting intense sanctions
such as embargoes, which typically have greater penalties compared to a travel ban
or import restriction. Because we have evidence that sanctions in general do change
reporting behavior, looking at different tiers of sanctions could also yield interesting
information. To analyze this equation 3.1 is modified with the inclusion of new
dummy variables that take the value of 1 in the presence of a certain tier of sanction.
For the difference in reported imports and exports this is given by:
ln(M)i,j,t − ln(X)i,j,t = αi,j + αi,t + αj,t + β1SX(L,M,I)i,j,t + β2SM(L,M,I)i,j,t (3.2)
+β3EIAi,j,t + i,j,t
where the variables are the same as equation 3.1 but SXi,j,t(L,M, I) is a vector of
three dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the exporting country i is imposing an
intense, moderate or light sanction on country j, respectively. The reverse is true for
SMi,j,t(L,M, I), a vector of three dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the importing
country j is imposing an intense, moderate or light sanction on country i.
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The results of this are given in column 1 of Table 3.5. The signs are the same as
Table 3.4, where exporter imposed sanctions are associated with positive coefficients
and importer sanctions are associated with negative coefficients. Intense sanctions
are associated with larger changes in the difference between exports and reported
imports. Intense exporter sanctions are associated with an approximately 24.7%
increase in the difference between exports and reported imports, significant at the
5% level. Again comparing this result to Kellenberg and Levinson (2016), an intense
exporter sanction results in the a change in reporting behavior similar in magnitude
to the largest tariff observed in that chapter’s dataset. This indicates that much
of the negative relationship found in the previous section is being driven by intense
sanctions.
Importer Intense and Importer Moderate sanctions are not individually signifi-
cant, but are jointly significant at the 10% level, with coefficients indicating a 14.9%
increase in the difference between exports and reported imports and a 7.39% increase,
respectively. Overall this gives support to the theory that more intense sanctions leads
to greater changes in reporting behavior based on the location of the reporting firm.
From here it is clear that even accounting for different types of sanctions there
is evidence of cheating, or at least altered reporting behaviors as a result of imposed
economic sanctions.
3.5 Misreporting Behavior During Sanction Threats
One possible cause of the previous results is that rather than a change in reporting be-
havior caused by sanction cheating, it might rather be a result of the sanction regime
changing the costs for transporting goods between the sanctioner/target country pair
in a systematic way. A sanction regime indicates an increase in tensions between the
countries and are often the result of policy choices of the target country. Although the
country-year fixed effects αj,t and αi,t can partially control for this in terms of policies
specific to country j or country i, there are potential bilateral policies that could lead
to an increase in insurance costs and fees that might be driving the previous results
rather than it being evidence of cheating.
However if the previous results are being driven by changes in transport and insur-
ance costs caused by policies and increased uncertainty not picked up by the country
year fixed effects, these should also be present when sanctions are being threatened.
If there are sanctions being threatened, then there is a risk of sanctions being imposed
suddenly and relevant in-transit shipping might be caught out, increasing insurance
costs and required fees. On the other hand, if the results are being driven by firms
subverting the sanctions then there would be no significant effect during the sanction
threat period. Before the sanction is imposed, trade between the countries is legal
and there is no incentive to change reporting behavior.
I will therefore run the previous regression again but include exporter threats and
importer threats in addition to imposed sanctions to test whether the prior results
are driven by systematic changes to insurance and transport costs or whether it is
driven by firms changing reporting behavior which might indicate cheating.
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ln(M)i,j,t − ln(X)i,j,t = αi,j + αi,t + αj,t + β1SXi,j,t + β2SMi,j,t (3.3)
+β3T
X
i,j,t + β4T
M
i,j,t + β5EIAi,j,t + i,j,t
Where the variables are the same as equation 3.1 but where TXi,j,t represent exporter
threats, taking the value of 1 if country i is threatening country j with sanctions
during period t. The reverse is importer threats TMi,j,t, which takes the value of 1 if
country j is threatening country i with sanctions during period t.
If the coefficients on the threat variables are similar to the coefficients for the
imposed sanctions, that indicates that the results are caused by shocks to trade costs
and insurance fees as a result of the sanction events. However if the threat coefficients
are insignificant, that indicates that the results from the previous sections are being
driven by a change in reporting behavior that indicates cheating behavior.
The results of this analysis are given in column 1 of Table 3.6. The the coeffi-
cients on the threat variables are statistically insignificant, indicating that there is
no significant change in the difference between reported imports and exports dur-
ing a sanction threat. In addition, the coefficients for imposed sanctions are not
significantly changed from 3.4, with both importer and exporter imposed sanctions
maintaining their sign, significance and are of similar magnitude. Taken together this
means that the inclusion of the threat variables does not affect the results from the
prior regressions in any significant way.
This indicates that the results are being driven by reporting behavior changes
during the sanction event, meaning it is related to the legality of trade between the two
nations. I also conclude that these results are not being driven by systematic changes
to insurance costs or transport fees, because if it were then a similar changes in the
difference between reported imports and exports would be found during sanction
threats.
3.6 Third Party Misreporting
As an additional test I examine whether third party countries that are not involved
in the sanction regime change their reporting behavior with targeted countries during
the sanction event. If the previous results are being driven by something other than
reporting behavior changes because of the legal penalties of breaking a sanction, then
it should also be observed for the targeted nations other trade partners. If there
was a general change in reporting behavior for example that was not focused on the
sanction-target pair, but was instead a general result of policy this could explain
the previous observations and provide evidence against sanction cheating being the
primary driver of my results. It is not illegal for third parties to trade during a
sanction event, and so if this change in the difference in reported imports and exports
changes with third party nations as well then we can conclude sanction cheating is
not the primary cause.
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To study this question I modify equation 3.1 with measures of 3rd party purchases
and 3rd party sales to the target nation during sanction events.
ln(M)i,j,t − ln(X)i,j,t = αi,j + αi,t + αj,t + β1SXi,j,t + β2SMi,j,t (3.4)
+β3D
X
i,j,t + β4D
M
i,j,t + β5EIAi,j,t + i,j,t
Where everything is identical to equation 3.1, with the addition of third party sales
given by DXi,t, which takes the value of 1 for country j’s top 10 suppliers not involved
in the sanction during a sanction imposed on it during period t. If there is some other
effect unrelated to the legality of trade during the sanction that is driving the previous
observed changes in reporting behavior, then the coefficient on this term should be
negative and similar to the coefficient for importer imposed sanctions. The reverse for
third party purchases is given by DMi,t , which takes the value of 1 for country i’s top 10
customer nations not involved during sanction events where country i has a sanction
imposed on it. Again if there is some factor not related to sanction cheating driving
prior results then the coefficient on this variable should be positive and similar to the
coefficient for exporter imposed sanctions.
The results of this regression are given in column 1 of Table 3.7. The coefficients for
3rd party sales and 3rd party purchases are both close to zero and highly insignificant,
indicating that there is no change in the difference between reported imports and
reported exports with those third parties and the target nations during sanction
events. The coefficients on importer imposed and exporter imposed also remain
consistent in sign and magnitude to previous regressions, indicating that accounting
for these third parties does not alter the original observations.
Based on this I conclude that there is not some general factor affecting reporting
behavior by the target of a sanction event and all of its trade partners, but it is specif-
ically associated with the sanctioner-target country pair. In addition the change in
reporting behavior is consistent with the different incentives and penalties associated
with whether a firm is located in the country imposing the sanction or the target
of that sanction. I find this to be strong evidence of sanction cheating, or at least
changes in reporting behavior that would be consistent with sanction cheating. There
might be an argument that during intense sanctions the sanctioning country might
use its maximum political influence that would incite third party countries to change
their reporting behavior, but I don’t find significant evidence for this either.
3.7 Specific Country Behavior
By using the difference between CIF Imports and FOB Exports as the dependent
variable in a panel gravity model I have gathered evidence that in general there is
cheating during sanction events, or at least changes in reporting behavior that would
indicate the presence of sanctions cheating. However this same process can also be
used as a tool to study behavior of specific countries. I will examine the USA’s
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sanction events as an example of what this procedure could be used for, by augment-
ing equation 3.1 with new dummy variables interacting the sanctions dummies with
interaction terms for the country.
ln(M)i,j,t − ln(X)i,j,t = αi,j + αi,t + αj,t + β1SXi,j,t + β2USASan/Exi,j,t (3.5)
+β3USA
Tar/Imp
i,j,t + β4S
M
i,j,t + β2USA
San/Imp
i,j,t + β3USA
Tar/Ex
i,j,t + β5EIAi,j,t + i,j,t
Where the variables are the same as equation 3.1, but augmented with interaction
terms for the potential cases of the USA’s involvement, whether they are the exporting
country i (Ex), the importing country j (Imp), imposing a sanction (Imp) or being
targeted by a sanction (Tar). This means that USA
San/Ex
i,j,t is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the exporting country i is the United States and imposing a
sanction on country j in time period t. USA
Tar/Imp
i,j,t is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the importing country j is the United States and is being targeted by a
sanction from country j in time period t. USA
San/Imp
i,j,t is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the importing country j is the United States and imposing a sanction
on country i in time period t. Finally USA
Tar/Ex
i,j,t is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the exporting country i is the United States and is being targeted by a
sanction from country j in time period t.
Results of this regression are found in 3.9, sorted so that the country interaction
term is with the standard sanction dummy for easier comparison. I focus here on the
behavior of American firms when the US is imposing sanctions on a target country.
To find the effect when the USA is the exporter imposing a sanction on some target
country, I add the coefficient for Exporter Sanction to the USA Sanctioner / Exporter
coefficient. Thus the total impact is 0.142 - 0.145 = -0.003, or negative and close to
zero. Both variables are significant, at the 1% and 5% level respectively. This means
that there is no shift in the gap between imports and reported exports when the USA
is imposing sanctions as an exporter, meaning that for the USA in this case there is
no evidence of cheating or changes in reporting behavior.
When the USA is the importer targeting another country with a sanction, then
the total effect is adding to together the importer sanction coefficient and the coef-
ficient for the USA Sanctioner / Importer variable. Although neither coefficient is
statistically significant at the usual levels, jointly they are significant at the 5% level.
Adding their coefficients together -0.036 - 0.129 = -0.165, or the gap between imports
and reported exports shrinks. This indicates that imports are falling faster than ex-
ports, meaning that American firms are hiding their imports relative to what firms
in the exporting country are reporting. Thus it seems that American firms change
their reporting behavior in such a way that is consistent with sanction cheating when
the US tries to prevent goods coming into the country.
In summary, it appears that American firms obey sanction restrictions in terms of
sales to the target country. However, American firms do exhibit changes in reporting
behavior consistent with cheating when they are importing goods from countries
targeted by US sanctions.
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Another country used for this is Russia, with the results given by 3.10. By contrast
to the United States, where firms tended to respect government restrictions stating
not to sell to foreign governments, in Russia there seems to be strong evidence of
sanction cheating on the part of exporters. There is a 0.0733 coefficient for exporter
imposed sanctions, significant at the 5% significance level. In addition, Russia im-
posing sanctions as an exporter causes the gap between reported log imports and
reported log exports to increase by a further 0.667, significant at the 1% level. Even
when the central government restricts sales of goods, firms continue to sell at a rate
above other countries.
There is also evidence that Russian firms continue to import when their gov-
ernment is trying to restrict imports at a rate consistent with other countries. The
coefficient on importer imposed sanctions in this regression is -0.099, significant at the
1% level. The coefficient for Russia specifically imposing sanctions as an importing
country is positive, but very imprecisely measured and not statistically significant.
Combined this gives an indication that Russian firms do not follow directives
from the government. US firms do not sell to countries that are being sanctioned by
the US government, but Russian firms will sell to countries being sanctioned by the
Russian government. Firms in both countries will continue to buy from firms under
sanction, or at least reporting behavior in both countries change in a way consistent
with cheating the sanctions.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter examined whether or not there is sanction cheating during economic
sanctions by firms in the sanctioning country subverting the sanction regime. I did
this by examining the difference in what one country reported as imports and what a
partner country reported as exports to see if there was a change in reporting behavior
during sanction events. Theoretically this difference should change depending on
where the sanctions originate, in the exporting country or the importing country,
based on the incentives and penalties for being caught breaking the sanction. Firms
in the country where the sanction originates face far higher costs and penalties for
being caught subverting the sanction, which is breaking the law, versus firms in the
country being targeted. In the target countries subverting the sanction might even
be encouraged as a form of resistance against foreign influence.
I ran regressions using the difference between the natural log of one country’s re-
ported imports and the corresponding trade partner’s logged reported exports. This
difference should be positive generally, as imports include the value of transporting
the goods, insurance and other fees. I find that during a sanction imposed by the
importing country, the difference between reported logged imports and logged ex-
ports falls by a coefficient of -0.0986, which is significant at the 5% level. This is
equivalent to cutting the average gap between reported imports and exports in half,
and corresponds to a reporting behavior change equivalent to the change found af-
ter a two standard deviation increase in tariffs as found by Kellenberg and Levinson
(2016). It is also in line with the theoretical prediction, where firms in the importing
country face prosecution for being found out subverting the sanctions and so reported
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trade falls greatly. However, firms in the exporting country do not face those same
threats of prosecution and so do not hide their existing trade as thoroughly. This is
reversed for the exporter imposed sanction, where the gap between reported imports
and exports increased by a coefficient of 0.746, also significant at the 5% level. This
is again a major change in reporting behavior comparable to the change in reporting
behavior observed by Kellenberg and Levinson (2016) for a major increase in tariffs,
that matches the predicted result based on the incentives for firms in the different
countries.
These results do not appear to be driven by shocks to insurance costs or trans-
portation fees as a result of uncertainty during the economic sanction, as this uncer-
tainty would also exist during the period of time where sanctions are being threatened
and could be imposed at any time. No change in reporting behavior is found during
sanction threats. Similarly there is not some general policy change that occurs during
sanctions to change reporting behavior by the target nation and its trade partners
generally, the change in reporting behavior is only observed between the sanctioner-
target pair. These results are also not driven by large outliers in the data, as removing
them does not substantively change the coefficients or significance of the results.
Based on this I conclude that I have detected cheating during sanction events, or
at least changes in reporting behavior that strongly suggest cheating. Trade flows
reported by the sanctioning country fall more relative to trade flows reported by
the target country, consistent with firms in the country imposing the sanction being
careful to avoid being caught subverting the sanction. Meanwhile firms in the target
face much less pressure to hide their true trade flows, so their reported trade flows do
not fall as much relative to trade flows reported by the sanctioning country. Therefore
it seems that firms do in fact cheat during sanctions in a general way that be observed
in aggregate data examining a wide variety of sanctions over many decades, or at least
change their reporting behaviors in ways that imitate what would be occurring if there
were cheating.
3.9 Tables and Figures
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Table 3.1: Sanction Descriptions
Sanction Type Description Imposed Cases
Blockade Imposer attempts to prevent all
countries from economic interac-
tions with target country.
37
Embargo Imposer cuts all economic activity
between itself and the target.
51
Partial Embargo Imposer cuts economic activity in
certain sectors with the target
country.
118
Import Restriction Imposer restricts imports from the
target country.
447
Export Restriction Imposer restricts exports to the tar-
get country.
58
Withdrawal from EA. Imposer withdraws from previously
negotiated economic arrangements.
55
Asset Freeze Imposer seizes all or part of the tar-
get state’s assets in the imposing
country’s jurisdiction.
34
Reduction in Foreign Aid Imposer reduces or terminates for-
eign aid to the target country.
191
Travel Ban Imposer bans travel to and from the
target country, either in general or
for specific individuals.
55
This table is based on the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions categories.
The number of imposed sanction events are reported in the third column.
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Table 3.2: Sanction Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Sanction 0.0056 0.0748
Intense San. 0.0008 0.0295
Moderate San. 0.0035 0.059
Light San. 0.0041 0.0639
Threat 0.005 0.071
These statistics are based on the 282,625 observations
of the combined dataset. The mean of the sanctions
and threat are the percentage of country-year
observations featuring a sanction or threat.
Table 3.3: Trade Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log Imports 15.766 3.309 -3.78 26.9
Log Exports 15.592 3.408 -5.74 26.74
Log Difference 0.174 1.556 -14.853 20.193
These statistics are based on the 282,625 observations
of the combined dataset.
Copyright c© Kevin Allen, 2019.
Table 3.4: Imposed Sanction Cheating
Importer Sanction -0.0986**
(0.0383)
Exporter Sanction 0.0746**
(0.0312)
Trade Agreement -0.00273
(0.00582)
Observations 282,582
R-squared 0.495
Country Pair Clustered Robust standard errors in parentheses
Regression includes country-pair and country-year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Tiered Sanction Cheating
Intense Importer San. -0.149
(0.107)
Moderate Importer San. -0.0739
(0.0464)
Light Importer San. -0.0488
(0.0514)
Intense Exporter San. 0.247**
(0.124)
Moderate Exporter San. 0.0302
(0.0401)
Light Exporter San. 0.0433
(0.0390)
Trade Agreement -0.00276
(0.00582)
Observations 282,582
R-squared 0.495
Country Pair Clustered Robust standard errors in parentheses
Regression includes country-pair and country-year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6: Reporting During Sanction Threats
Importer Sanction -0.0785*
(0.0411)
Exporter Sanction 0.0887**
(0.0410)
Imp. Sanction Threats -0.0368
(0.0466)
Exp. Sanction Threats -0.0245
(0.0517)
Trade Agreement -0.00269
(0.00582)
Observations 282,582
R-squared 0.495
Country Pair Clustered Robust standard errors in parentheses
Regression includes country-pair and country-year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: 3rd Party Reporting Changes
Importer Sanction -0.100***
(0.0386)
Exporter Sanction 0.0761**
(0.0313)
3rd Party Sales -0.0147
(0.0186)
3rd Party Purchases 0.00588
(0.0192)
EIA -0.00270
(0.00581)
Observations 282,582
R-squared 0.495
Country Pair Clustered Robust standard errors in parentheses
Regression includes country-pair and country-year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.8: Heterogeneous 3rd Party Reporting Changes
Importer Sanction -0.102***
(0.0386)
Exporter Sanction 0.0740**
(0.0314)
3rd Party Sales (Int. San) 0.00728
(0.0468)
3rd Party Sales (Mod. San) 0.00442
(0.0214)
3rd Party Sales (Light San) -0.0466
(0.0313)
3rd Party Purchases (Int. San) -0.0674
(0.0519)
3rd Party Purchases (Mod. San) -0.00603
(0.0216)
3rd Party Purchases (Light San) 0.0232
(0.0260)
Trade Agreement -0.00264
(0.00582)
Observations 282,582
R-squared 0.495
Country Pair Clustered Robust standard errors in parentheses
Regression includes country-pair and country-year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.9: USA Cheating Behavior
Exporter Sanction 0.142***
(0.0473)
USA Sanctioner / Exporter -0.145**
(0.0609)
Importer Sanction -0.0355
(0.0515)
USA Sanctioner / Importer -0.129
(0.0788)
USA Target / Importer -0.0544
(0.197)
USA Target / Exporter -0.262
(0.174)
Trade Agreement -0.00256
(0.00582)
Observations 282,582
R-squared 0.495
Country Pair Clustered Robust standard errors in parentheses
Regression includes country-pair and country-year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10: Russia Cheating Behavior
Exporter Sanction 0.0733**
(0.0313)
Russia Sanctioner / Exporter 0.667***
(0.140)
Importer Sanction -0.0990***
(0.0384)
Russia Sanctioner / Importer 0.272
(0.180)
Russia Target / Importer -0.703**
(0.296)
Russia Target / Exporter -0.497**
(0.202)
Trade Agreement -0.00275
(0.00582)
Observations 282,582
R-squared 0.495
Country Pair Clustered Robust standard errors in parentheses
Regression includes country-pair and country-year fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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